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Sri Lanka has rich experience in pursuing a variety of strategies to achieve food 
security.  They range from the projectionist policies implemented mainly during 1948 to 
1977, to open economic policies implemented since 1977.  For the paddy/rice sector, the 
government continues to restrict rice imports due to fears that rice trade liberalization 
would have adverse impacts on poverty.  On the domestic front, however, paddy 
procurement, milling and distribution are mainly done by the private sector. The 
production of paddy is mainly carried out by small farmers and, on an average, resource-
use is found to be inefficient.  While some researchers believe that the paddy-rice 
marketing system is competitive, many consider that it is characterized by a group of 
oligopolistic buyers.  Finally, on the consumption side, the demand for rice, the staple 
food, is found to be price and income inelastic.   
The overall objective of this research project is to assess the impacts of different 
types of government policies (pertaining to the domestic and external sectors) on the 
status of food security in the country, with particular emphasis on the paddy/rice sector.  
Specifically, the goals of this study are: 
(a) To describe the present status of paddy production, procurement and distribution 
system in Sri Lanka, paying special attention to the involvement of government 
agencies and private sector. 
(b) To document the evolution of domestic and trade policies affecting the above 
system showing the extent of liberalization over time. 
(c) To examine Sri Lanka’s position on the Agreement on Agriculture in the WTO 
and its likely impact on paddy/rice sector. 
(d) To investigate the impact of rice trade liberalization and privatization of paddy 
procurement system on prices, supply of paddy, demand for rice, imports of rice 
and calorie intake at the national level. vii 
(e) To investigate the impact of rice trade liberalization at the household level, and 
for various groups in the population, with a view to understand the implications 
for poverty. 
(f)  To investigate the likely impacts of elimination of oligopsony power of the paddy 
collectors on the well being of paddy farmers. 
Following the introduction, the second chapter of the study provides a detailed 
background about paddy/rice in Sri Lanka from the point of view of production, storage, 
distribution channels and international trade. Some of the important information in the 
case of paddy and rice has been presented below:  
(a) Paddy occupied the greatest land under agriculture of all the crops in 2001, 
contributing 15 percent to the agriculture sector GDP. Seventy percent of paddy 
farmers are smallholders (with a land area of less than one hectare) and the crop is 
heavily dependent on rainfall.  
(b) After milling paddy is known as rice, which is the staple food in Sri Lanka, and 
the main source of calories in the people’s diet.  
(c) Due to the significance of the paddy sector in the Sri Lankan economy, 
governments have placed a great emphasis on increasing paddy production in 
order to achieve self-sufficiency. Large-scale irrigation projects and land 
development and settlement schemes were undertaken and the government also 
provided free irrigation water, fertilizer subsidies and guaranteed prices to 
farmers.  
(d) Accordingly, productivity more than tripled from 1129 kg/hectare in 1970 to 3954 
kg/hectare in 2001. At present, the country is 90% self-sufficient in rice, and 
imports have dropped to less than 10% of the level in 1970 although it has 
fluctuated over the years. viii 
(e) The government was heavily involved in the marketing of paddy and rice up to 
1977. In 1977, with the implementation of economic liberalization policies, 
private sector participation was allowed and as a result of competition there was a 
dramatic reduction in the government’s share in marketing paddy to just 10% in 
1995. 
(f)  With regard to storage, paddy is stored and the carry-over stocks are maintained 
for rice. Farmers sell about half the produce immediately to meet cash 
requirements and the balance is stored using a traditional system known as 
“Bissa”, which tends to result in a high rate of post-harvest losses. Paddy is also 
stored by the collectors and millers.  
(g) Storage facilities for rice belonging to the government are very poor at present. 
Due to the low keeping time of rice, storage by private wholesalers also tends to 
be only for short periods of about a month. 
The third chapter traces the evolution of domestic and trade policies affecting the 
food procurement, storage and distribution system in Sri Lanka over time. They are 
chronologically enumerated below: 
(a) In the 1930s and 1940s policies were directed at developing the dry zone for the 
cultivation of rice. However, the main problem associated with paddy was low 
yield due to the large number of smallholdings. Therefore, successive 
governments focused efforts on promoting rice production in order to achieve 
food self-sufficiency. 
(b) The universal rice-rationing scheme (RSS) was initiated in 1942 to ensure 
equitable distribution of available food resources. The distribution system 
comprised consumer co-operative societies with an island-wide network of retail 
shops. There were two main sources of food to meet the RSS requirements – 
domestic procurement and imports. The government encouraged domestic food ix 
production and strengthened the food procurement system in order to try to reduce 
the dependence on the international market and develop domestic agriculture.  
(c) Internal Purchase System (IPS) – The government introduced this in 1942 to meet 
the demand for rice by the RSS. 
(d) IPS was replaced by a scheme called “Marketing of Home Grown Foods” in 
1948, in order to improve the functioning of domestic marketing channels. 
(e) In 1961 the government introduced the Domestic Produce Purchasing and Storage 
Act of 1961, in response to the greater marketable surplus available with farmers. 
The purpose was to strengthen the role of co-operative societies in marketing. 
(f) The  1960s also witnessed the setting up of several state enterprises to promote 
non-paddy agricultural activities. Examples are the National Milk Board, Ceylon 
Fisheries Corporation and Fisheries Harbor Corporation. 
(g) Trend in international rice prices have tended to affect international procurements. 
During the three decades 1950-70 the government entered into bilateral trade 
agreements with China and Burma to secure rice in reliable quantities. 
(h) From the 1970s onward, the government was confronted with high international 
rice prices and insufficient foreign exchange, and therefore had to procure more 
rice domestically. 
(i)  The Paddy Marketing Board (PMB) was established in 1971 in order to purchase 
more paddy through domestic channels. Disappointingly, despite the monopoly 
power vested with PMB, paddy procurement fell under the Guaranteed Price 
Scheme to 27% of total production in 1974 from 48% in 1971. The situation did 
not improve even though the government instituted measures such as the 
prohibition of storage of greater than a certain minimum amount of paddy by 
farmers, and also increased procurement price. This was on account of high prices x 
paid by the private sector for rice. The government also imposed rules whereby 
rice meals were to be substituted by non-rice meals in schools and public 
institutions. 
(j)  The Food Stamp Scheme was introduced in 1978, which aimed at targeting the 
poorest households in the country. Government intervention in promoting 
production and marketing of food grains dropped markedly after this scheme was 
implemented. 
(k) The RSS was discontinued in 1979. 
(l) After  1977 there was a marked change in policies toward greater economic 
liberalization and private sector participation.  
(m) With respect to rice the changes involved allowing private sector companies to 
import rice from 1988 onward under a strict quota system. 
 In 1995 rice imports were liberalized and the licensing system was abolished and 
replaced with a tariff rate of 35%. This rate was reduced to 20% later that year. The tariff 
rate remained unchanged but waivers were granted at different rates in specified periods 
to curtail increasing prices in the domestic market due to production shortages in the 
market. In the area of procurement, PMB’s procurement fell as low as 1.3% of total 
production for the period 1993-1995. 
In the fourth chapter, the author examines Sri Lanka’s position under the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and analyzes the likely implications. There are three 
pillars in the Agreement on Agriculture – market access, domestic support and export 
subsidies.  
(a) Regarding market access provisions, Sri Lanka has bound nearly 99 percent of its 
tariffs on agricultural products including rice at 50% under the AoA, and it has 10 
years from 1995 onward to bring down these tariffs.  AoA requires member xi 
countries to use import tariffs to restrict imports rather than quantitative 
restrictions. 
(b) Sri Lanka does not have commitments with regard to domestic support and export 
subsidies, as these are based on the base levels of such support during 1986-88 
and Sri Lanka did not have any trade distorting programs during this time.  Due to 
commitments with the AoA Sri Lanka will not be in a position to implement any 
new subsidies. 
(c) As a result, impacts of AoA on the paddy/rice sector will be negligible.  If Sri 
Lanka wishes to implement new subsidy programs on paddy, they may be 
requested under the special and differential treatment.  
In the fifth chapter the author uses a partial equilibrium model to assess the 
national level impacts of rice trade liberalization, treating Sri Lanka as a small net 
importer of rice. The details of the model are: 
(a) The consumer side is represented by a demand system for cereals (of the AIDS 
functional form) and the producer side by a paddy supply function. The marketing 
functions are captured by an equation to link paddy prices and rice prices. 
Government procurement is considered as an exogenous variable affecting 
marketing functions. A tariff barrier and other border charges link the retail price 
of rice with the world market price of rice. 
(b) The identities used in the model are as follows: Calorie intake from rice, wheat 
and millet were used to obtain total calorie intake. Rice production has been 
considered a constant proportion of paddy production, and rice imports have been 
considered as the difference between domestic production and consumption. 
 xii 
(c)  Changes in trade policy are simulated by changing tariff levels  and  by    
eliminating other border charges that affect the retail price of rice, and changes in 
paddy procurement policy are simulated by changing the proportion of paddy 
procured by government institutes. 
(d) The data used was obtained from food balance sheets and the Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka. 
(e) The findings of the simulation exercises are as follows: 
With trade liberalization, calorie intake increases, suggesting greater food 
security. Moreover, producer prices would fall, which would lower incomes of paddy 
farmers and reduce their capacity to purchase food. Since most of these farmers are small 
holders who are below the poverty line, the repercussions would be worse. The central 
question is whether the gains to consumers will exceed losses to producers and the 
underlying assumptions of the model suggest that they will. However, this result must be 
viewed with the caveat that the model does not study the how the impact of lower wages 
of the small holders would affect their consumption. 
In the absence of government procurement, paddy prices will be further 
depressed, as private purchasers of paddy would exercise oligopsony power on paddy 
sellers/producers. This is because paddy sellers need to sell their produce immediately in 
order to obtain cash to meet repayment obligations and because they lack storage 
facilities. Therefore they are in a weak bargaining position. Moreover the market 
structure in the case of paddy is such that there are fewer millers of paddy than suppliers, 
which allows the millers to exert oligopsony power. 
The policy recommendations that arise from this part of the study are that rice 
trade liberalization should be encouraged as a strategy to ensure food security, since it 
lowers prices and increases calorie consumption, both of which would be directly 
beneficial to consumers. The government should devise some method to monitor the 
oligospsony power that the millers are able to exert over the farmers. xiii 
In the sixth chapter, household level impacts of trade liberalization are assessed 
on various population groups. The analysis is based on the method used by McCulloch 
(2000), and the relative importance of rice and paddy in the total expenditure and income 
respectively of the particular population group is estimated in order to indicate the extent 
to which they will be affected by rice trade liberalization. The population groups are 
specified on the base of expenditure class, province, sector (rural, urban, estate), and by 
size of land holding. The policy shock introduced in this exercise is a 25% drop in rice 
and paddy prices. The findings are that there is a net gain to all the income groups, 
provinces and sectors. The biggest gainers are the lowest expenditure, those residing in 
the Northwestern province and those who are part of the estate sector, where the 
incidence of poverty is found to be the highest. Paddy farmers with relatively bigger 
holdings, on the other hand, are found to be negatively affected. Therefore, overall it 
appears from the results that rice trade liberalization is a pro-poor policy. 
Finally, this study examines the impacts of trade liberalization in imperfectly 
competitive markets.  The objective is to assess the impacts of rice trade liberalization in 
the presence and absence of market power. For this purpose, a partial equilibrium model 
is developed for the paddy market in Sri Lanka, under oligopsony, since the bargaining 
power of paddy suppliers is smaller than that of paddy buyers. Using this model, impacts 
of trade liberalization were simulated. Results reveal that losses to paddy producers due 
to trade liberalization can be minimized if oligoposony power can be eliminated 
simultaneously.  Therefore, strategies to eliminate oligopsony power along with trade 
liberalization are recommended to achieve efficiency gains. 
The study concludes by drawing policy implications, based on the analysis and 
findings of the study. Some of the important ones are that rice trade should be liberalized, 
as it leads to an increase in efficiency and net gains at the national level. (As mentioned 
earlier, this result should be interpreted keeping in mind the caveat of the model, which is 
that the impact on the consumption of the smallholders whose wages are adversely 
affected by trade liberalization has not been considered). A second policy implication is xiv 
that government procurement should continue but private sector participation in imports 
should be allowed. Finally, the findings of this study indicate that methods to help 
farmers combat the oligopsony power of millers should be provided.   These may include 
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1.1  TRADE POLICIES AND MARKET REFORMS IN SRI LANKA 
Sri Lanka, classified as a lower middle income country at present, has rich 
experience in pursuing a variety of strategies to achieve food security.  In early 1940, 
food subsidy and food ration scheme was used to achieve food security.  Basic food items 
were provided to all individuals at subsidized prices and hence this policy can be 
considered as a universal price policy.  The pressure on the treasury was very high with 
this policy and it was found that the needy people could not acquire the benefits of the 
policy.  Between 1970 to 1977, The mechanisms used included adjustment of prices of 
rationed food, reduction of the entitlement of food rations and removal of tax payers from 
the ration scheme, restriction on imports, state monopoly on food imports, distribution of 
food through co-operatives and price controls. 
Hence, in 1977, with the open economic policies, a food stamp program was 
implemented.  This was targeted only to the poor, and it was a kind of income transfer 
program in which an income was transferred only to purchase a number of food items 
and kerosene.  Food stamp program was converted to another program called Janasaviya 
in 1994, from which separate income transfers were provided for consumption and 
investment.  Janasaviya program was converted to a similar program called Samurdhi by 
broadening the coverage. 
Furthermore, from 1977 onwards, the policy was to increase the availability of 
food through liberalization of imports, allowing private sector to import and distribute, 
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abolition of quota and ration system and removal of distortions in prices through 
elimination of subsidies and price controls on food items. 
Due to commitments with global and regional trade agreements such as WTO, 
SAPTA, Indo-Lanka FTA, Pakistan-Sri Lanka FTA and due to commitments with donor 
agencies such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, Sri Lanka has 
been continuing to open up of its economy.  Certain policies implemented through this 
policy package may or may not adversely influence the broad objective of achieving food 
security. 
For paddy/rice sector, the government continues to restrict rice imports 
considering rice trade liberalization has adverse impacts on poverty.  However, paddy 
procurement, milling and distribution are mainly done by the private sector.  This study 
focuses on the impacts of different types of policies implemented by the successive 
governments in Sri Lanka, on the status of food security, with a special emphasis on 
paddy/rice industry. 
1.2 PREVIOUS  STUDIES 
Among the studies conducted in Sri Lanka on food security, many have attempted 
to measure them at the national level (Sanderatne, 2001; Kelegama, 2000), and there is a 
good understanding about the food security issue at the national level.  The poverty 
assessment reports provide a fair understanding about the basic needs of different types 
of households by region, employment, education, ethnicity, irrigation etc (Household 
Expenditure and Income Survey of the Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka 
Integrated Survey of the World Bank, Household Surveys of the International Water 
Management Institute).  Dietary and Health Survey of the Department of Census and 
Statistics provides some statistics of the individual food security.   
Studies conducted to assess the production efficiency of rice farming state that it 
is a relatively an inefficient enterprise (Amarasinghe, 1974; Karunaratne and Herath, 
1989; Abeyratne et al., 1990; Shilpi, 1995; Kikuchi et al., 2000; Rafeek and 
Samarathunage, 2000) and income from paddy farming is very small (Weerahewa et al., 3 
2003).  Studies conducted to evaluate consumption aspects state that rural sector is less 
price responsive than urban sector, while the rural sector is more responsive to 
expenditure than the urban sector (Tudawe, 2002), and there are significant differences 
among the elasticity estimates between participants and non participants of food aid 
(Bogahawatte, 1992).  Though paddy and rice marketing is a crucial aspect, relatively a 
few studies have been carried out to assess marketing efficiencies.  While some argue 
that it is competitive (Ellis et al., 1996; Harrison, 1995), others found that it is 
characterized by oligopolistic buyers (Rupasena, 2002; Dharmaratne and Hathurusinghe, 
1999).  The degree of protection given for the rice industry was evaluated Epaarachchi et 
al., (2002) using nominal and effective rates of protection and by Ekanayake (2003) 
using a partial equilibrium model.  They reveal that producers are protected at the 
expense of consumers.  Bogahawaate (1983), found that the increase in production of 
paddy due to increase in guaranteed price results in 47 percent growth in the long run 
paddy purchases.  Gunawardena and Oczkowski (1992) also state that the continuation of 
the guaranteed price scheme appears to play a positive role in providing incentives to 
producers. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES 
The overall objective of this study is to investigate the effects of domestic policies 
that relate to agricultural trade liberalization and market reforms on national and 
household food security in Sri Lanka with special emphasis on paddy/rice sector. Specific 
objectives of this study are: 
(a) To describe the present status of paddy production, procurement and distribution 
system in Sri Lanka, paying special attention to the involvement of government 
agencies and private sector. 
(b) To document the evolution of domestic and trade policies affecting the above 
system showing the extent of liberalization over time. 
(c) To examine Sri Lanka’s position on the Agreement on Agriculture in the WTO 
and its likely impact on paddy/rice sector. 4 
(d) To investigate the impact of rice trade liberalization and privatization of paddy 
procurement system on prices, supply of paddy, demand for rice, imports of rice 
and calorie intake at the national level. 
(e) To investigate the impact of rice trade liberalization at the household level, and 
for various groups in the population, with a view to understand the implications 
for poverty. 
(f)  To investigate the likely impacts of elimination of oligopsony power of the paddy 
collectors on the well being of paddy farmers. 
1.4 ORGANIZATION 
The report is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents the present status of paddy 
production, procurement and distribution system in Sri Lanka.  Chapter 3 shows the 
evolution of trade policies and market reform policies affecting agricultural sector in Sri 
Lanka.  Chapter 4 shows the commitments with the WTO to further liberalize agricultural 
markets.  Chapter 5 assesses the impacts of rice trade liberalization and market reforms 
performed to privatize paddy procurement on calorie intake at national level.  Chapter 6 
assesses the impacts of rice trade liberalization on poverty at regional levels. Chapter 7 
assesses the impacts of oligopsony power on income from paddy farming at national 
level. Report ends with a chapter on summary, conclusion and suggestions for further 




2.  PADDY PRODUCTION, PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM IN SRI LANKA 
2.1      INTRODUCTION 
In Sri Lanka, paddy sector plays an important role. In the year 2001, it has 
contributed 15 per cent to the agriculture sector GDP and 3.1 per cent to the total GDP. 
Paddy occupies the largest land area under agriculture and in the year 2001, the gross 
extent sown was 798,000 ha. Generally, paddy occupies about 45 per cent of the total 
permanent agriculture land holdings. A majority of the paddy farmers, 70 per cent, are 
smallholders with a land area of less than 1 ha. Paddy is cultivated during two seasons, 
maha and yala. Maha (October to March) usually accounts for about 65 per cent of the 
annual production and the rest 35 per cent coming from the yala crop (April to 
September). Normally paddy is planted between 750,000 to 850,000 ha annually, of this 
maha accounts for 500,000 to 550,000 ha and yala accounts for about 300,000 to 350,000 
ha. Two thirds of the paddy extent is grown under irrigated conditions and the paddy crop 
is heavily dependent on rainfall.                     
After milling, paddy is known as rice. Rice is the staple food in the country and is 
the main source of calories in the Sri Lankan diet. The average per capita consumption is 
about 300 grams of rice and it provides about 1,050 Kcal per day, meeting 45 per cent of 
the per capita protein requirement. Given the significance of the paddy sector in the Sri 
Lankan economy, all successive governments have placed a grater emphasis on 
increasing paddy production in order to achieve self-sufficiency. Therefore, a larger 
amount of investments were geared towards the improvement of the paddy sector. Large-
scale irrigation projects, land development and settlement schemes, free provision of 
irrigation water, fertilizer subsidies and guarantied prices were some of the investments 
made in order to improve the sector performance. These have improved the paddy 
cultivation in the country and at present country are enjoying a self-sufficiency level of 
about 90 per cent.  6 
2.2 LOCAL  PRODUCTION 
Although paddy is grown in both seasons — maha and yala — the major season is 
maha. Paddy production during maha is around 60 per cent of the total paddy production. 
Paddy is grown in almost all the districts but a significant contribution is made by 
Kurunagala, Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Monaragala, Hambantota and Ratnapura 
districts. Table 1 below shows paddy production statistics in Sri Lanka and it reveals that 
paddy production has significantly increased over the period 1970 to present. According 
to the statistics it is evident that this increasing paddy production is a result of 
improvements in the yield per hectare and the contribution by the extent sown is minimal. 
Government support schemes like provision of improved varieties, provision of fertilizer 
at a subsidized rate, extension programs like "yaya" demonstrations and also attractive 
prices during a given year could be considered as positive influences in enhancing the 
yield levels. Reasons behind the fluctuations in the extent sown could be considered as 
the weather and security conditions in the paddy growing areas. 
Table 1—Rice Production and Imports 
 







Rice Rice Rice Rice Rice
1970 759 969.6 677.4 526 64.83%
1975 696 692.4 1362 457 60.24%
1980 845 1279.8 1756.2 167 88.46%
1985 882 1596.6 2079 182 89.77%
1990 857 1522.8 2071.8 172 89.85%
1995 915 1686 2121 9 99.47%
1996 749 1236.6 2107.8 341 78.38%
1997 730 1343.4 2170.8 306 81.45%
1998 848 1615.2 2180.4 168 90.58%
1999 896 1720.8 2203.2 214 88.94%
2000 878 1716 2313.6 15 99.13%
2001 798 1617 2372.4 52 96.88%
 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Various years. 7 
2.3   RICE IMPORTS 
Even though the local paddy production has significantly increased over the years, 
Sri Lanka has to import a sizeable quantity of rice to meet the local demand. According 
to table 1, it is evident that the quantity of rice imported into the country has fluctuated 
significantly over the years. This is mainly due to the changing policy structures that are 
formulated purely to protect the domestic paddy producers. These policies have 
influenced the quantity of grains imported and the power of importing. 
Until 1990, the Food Commissioner's Department (FCD) had the monopoly 
power in rice imports but later this monopoly power was given to the Co-operative 
Wholesale Establishment (CWE). This government monopoly in importing rice 
continued until 1993. However, in 1993, the private sector was allowed to import rice 
under licenses. In 1996, this licensing scheme was also removed and allowed anyone to 
import rice at anytime at a specified duty of 35% (Rupasena and Ravichandran, 2000). In 
1997, the rice trade experienced a considerable degree of uncertainty and prices varied 
excessively during the year as trade policy relating to rice remained unpredictable 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1998). Even with a supply shortage in 1997, this 
unpredictable policy environment prevented the private sector importers from importing 
rice. Only for the fourth quarter of 1997, a duty wavier was granted for a short period 
enabling more rice imports. However, due to this uncertainty no buffer stocks were 
maintained during 1997 by the Bondsmen. 
Of the 168, 000 MT imports of rice in 1998, 75 per cent of the imports were 
imported during the month January. This is mainly due to the duty wavier introduced to 
reduce the escalating price of rice in the domestic market. However, this duty wavier did 
not continue during the latter part of 1998, as the government's main aim was to protect 
farmers' interests by stabilizing the paddy prices at a reasonable level. Rice imports 
during 1999 amounted to be 214,000 MT. Over two thirds of the imports were made 
during the months November and December. During this period, a partial reduction of 
duty on imports has granted with a view to stabilize domestic rice prices. The reduction 8 
of import duty on rice was from 10 to 35 per cent and was effective from 23 October 
1999 to 31 December 1999.  
In July 2000, the licensing scheme was re-imposed on the import of rice and 
continued until 22 November 2001 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2002). The government 
once again intervened in the market and allowed the private sector and the CWE to 
import 60,000 MT of rice on a duty free basis. This decision was taken due to escalating 
rice prices in the market that caused as a result of shortfalls in paddy production. Of the 
imports, CWE was allowed to import 30,000 MT, while the balance was equally 
distributed among 15 private sector importers. However, only the private sector importers 
had imported the full quota of 30,000 MT of rice while the CWE had imported only a 
portion of the allocated quantity before 10 December 2001. After 10 December to 31 
December 2001 the duty rate applicable for importing rice has changed from duty free to 
50 per cent of the normal duty. 
2.4 PADDY/RICE  MARKETING 
The concept of marketing covers all the activities in the flow of product from the 
point of production to the point of purchase by the consumer. In this process, a number of 
persons and organizations are involved and perform different functions like assembling, 
financing, grading and standardization, transporting, packing and sorting, processing and 
distribution. In Sri Lanka, more than half of the production of paddy comes to the market 
as the surplus. In marketing this surplus, both the private and the government sector 
institutions play a role. However, the level of operation by these groups has changed 
significantly over the years.  
Since 1948, paddy has been purchased by the government under a Guaranteed 
Price Scheme (GPS). Up to 1973, the price under this GPS was higher than the c.i.f. 
value of the paddy equivalent of imported rice. However, this price structure was 
reversed in 1974 (Yoshimura et al., 1975). With this reversal, collection of paddy by the 
government organizations started to decline. Before January 1972, functions related to 
paddy marketing were performed by the Department of Agrarian Services. However, in 9 
January 1972, these functions were taken over by the Paddy Marketing Board (PMB) that 
was formed in 1971. The PMB was set up by an Act of parliament (No. 14, 1971) as the 
sole marketing outlet for paddy in Sri Lanka.  This act allowed the PMB or their agents to 
have the sole authority in collecting paddy from the farmers, store, process and distribute 
the milled rice to the Food Commissioner's Department (FCD) in order to distribute to 
the consumers under the rice rationing scheme. During 1970s, rice was marketed 
principally through the government organizations. The co-operatives collected the paddy 
from the farmer on behalf of the PMB, which hired private millers to process the paddy. 
The millers handed over the rice to FCD, which in turn issued it to the co-operatives for 
distribution to the consumers on ration. Even though this could be considered as the legal 
channel in marketing rice at that time, there were illegal channels for marketing rice as 
well. Both the legal and illegal channels existed during the mid-1970s are shown in 
figures 1 and 2. Apart from the above marketing functions; collection, milling and 
distribution of paddy/rice, the PMB also involved in maintaining a "Buffer-Stock 
Scheme" for rice by using its regional warehouses in each region. This was primarily 
carried out with an aim of stabilizing rice prices in the market.  
The role of government in marketing paddy/rice was changed with the 
introduction of economic liberalization policies in 1977. In 1978, the PMB act was 
amended and allowed the private sector to involve in marketing rice based on 
competition. As a result of the intense competition, there was a dramatic reduction in the 
government's market share in purchasing paddy (Table 2). The government sector 
involvement mainly confined to farm and at retail levels. As in the past, the Agrarian 
Service Centers (ASC), PMB centers and Multipurpose Co-operative Societies (MPCS) 
purchased paddy from farmers under the GPS. The FCD was involved in distributing rice 
that was milled by the PMB. This public sector marketing channels of rice in the mid-
1980s are shown in figure 3.  
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Note: Main flow                         Very small flow  
Institutions are referred to as armed services, hospitals, hotels and eating-houses. 
 
 
Source: Yoshimura et al., 1975. 
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With the economic liberalization, the private sector started to perform nearly 80 
per cent of the marketing functions in the rice marketing system in Sri Lanka. At the farm 
level, a number of private participants involve in purchasing paddy. They are the 
assembly agents, brokers, small operators and rice millers. These assemblers are the first 
buyers of paddy and are often referred to as collectors. Some of them are paddy 
producers, input suppliers, and grocery traders. Many paddy assemblers are located in the 
paddy producing areas and only a very few hold stocks due to lack of storage facilities 
and finance. These assembly agents distribute the stocks of paddy to millers who are 
located in different parts of the country. Some of these millers stock paddy and mill it at a 
later stage. The amount of paddy milled usually depends on the prices of rice.  
Table 2—Market Share of the PMB 
 
Year  Total Paddy Production 
('000 MT) 
Paddy Purchases by the 
PMB ('000 MT) 
Percentage Market Share of 
the PMB 
1972 1305  551  42 
1975 1158  242  21 
1977 1681  513  31 
1980 2137  212  10 
1985 2487  324  13 
1990 2538  31  1.2 
1995 2810  282  10 
 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Various years. 13 





Note: ASC refers to the Agrarian Service Centers and MPCS refers to the Multipurpose Co-operative  
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The wholesalers in the Colombo market play a major role in the distribution 
channel. They operate under a commission basis as well as on a direct buying system 
from millers and sell rice to retailers. In addition to the distribution function, the 
wholesalers are also efficiently involved in making advance payments to suppliers, bulk 
breaking to match the demand, keep suppliers and distributors informed about the prices, 
make trading finance (Somaratne, 1987). The Colombo wholesale market handles about 
60 per cent of the total production of rice. After rice stocks reach the wholesale market, 
wholesalers sell rice to retailers in every part of the country. This private sector 
marketing channel that initiated after the economic liberalization policies are shown in 
figure 4.   
In the beginning of 1990, PMB had taken a decision to purchase paddy at 
competitive prices above the guaranteed price. Along with that decision, PMBs 
involvement in purchasing paddy showed a six-fold increase to 31,000 MT in 1990 over 
the purchases of 5 MT in 1989. The guaranteed price of paddy was revised upward in 
1993 to Rs. 155 per bushel and remained unchanged. However, PMB has not actively 
participated in purchasing paddy since 1996. In 1997, PMB has not purchased any paddy 
as the State relied farmer organizations to purchase paddy. These farmer organizations 
have also utilized some of the PMB stores in storing paddy. The CWE entered the paddy 
marketing activities during the 1996/97 maha season for the first time. These two 
organizations, the CWE and the farmer organizations continued to purchase paddy and 
helped to stabilize paddy prices. MPCSs purchase paddy through the co-operative shops 
located island wide hence, their network is bigger than that of the CWE. The number of 
MPCSs that were involved in paddy purchasing has increased from 55 in 1996/97 to 101 
in the year 2000. Similarly, the number of co-operatives involved in paddy purchasing 
increased from 210 in 1997 to 608 in the year 2000 (Rupasena and Ravichandran, 2000). 
Even though, the purchases by these organizations have increased from 1997 to 2000, the 
amount purchased is insignificant compared to that of the total production. In addition to 
the above government-based organizations, MARKFED (Sri Lanka Co-operative 
Marketing Federation Ltd.) has also started purchasing paddy from 1998. MARKFED 15 
has purchased samba varieties directly from the farmers in Polonnaruwa, Hingurakgoda 
and Thalawa areas. It also owns a mill with a capacity of 20,000 Kg per day and the rice 
is sold through its wholesale and retail outlets. However, it has purchased only 1,290 MT 
in the year 2000 (Rupasena and Ravichandran, 2000). This shows the greater 
involvement of the private sector in marketing paddy/rice. The present paddy/rice 
marketing system is shown in figure 5. 
 
Figure 4—Private Sector Marketing Channels 
Source: Somaratne, 1987. 
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2.5 STORAGE 
In Sri Lanka, paddy is stored and carry over stocks are maintained for rice. 
Farmers, collectors and millers store paddy. Most of the paddy farmers sell about 50 per 
cent of the marketable production soon after the harvest for immediate cash requirements 
and the balance is stored for later sales (Rupasena and Ravichandran, 2000). Some 
farmers store paddy on farm by using the traditional "Bissa system" but this system is 
considered to be ineffective as it causes more post-harvest losses. A majority of the large 
millers own storage facilities hence, they store paddy and mill at a late stage. Even 
though in the past, PMB has played a dominant role in storage by owning a number of 
high capacity stores in storing paddy now they are in the hands of the private sector. 
Therefore, at present the government sector has very poor storage facilities. Many 
participants in the marketing channel store paddy but the storage of rice is limited due to 
its low keeping quality. Therefore, wholesalers in the Colombo market store rice only for 
about a month.  
 
3.  EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC AND TRADE POLICIES AFFECTING 
PADDY PROCUREMENT, STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM  
IN SRI LANKA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the evolution of government policy in Sri Lanka with 
respect to paddy procurement, storage and distribution system. It discusses government 
policies of promoting agriculture and that of providing basic needs.  It then reviews the 
linkages between the two basic policies discussed above and the evolution of the 
marketing and procurement policy during different time periods in order to meet the 
needs of respective governments.  Since the independence government policy in Sri 
Lanka on food marketing is clearly identifiable into three policy regimes: a) the regime of 
promotion of domestic production and marketing in a less regulatory manner, b) the 
highly regulated domestic marketing and c) the liberalized regime.  The main discussion 18 
of the chapter revolves around paddy while the policies on other agricultural commodities 
are discussed when appropriate.  
3.2  GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN SRI LANKA 
3.2.1  Policies to Promote Agricultural Production 
Government strategy in the promotion of domestic agriculture during the last 
century, especially after legislation reforms in 1931 was to develop the dry zone of the 
country. By this time wet zone of the country was characterized by high population 
densities and much of the available cultivable land area was either used by commercial 
plantation agriculture or by rice farming in small fragmented holdings thus bringing new 
land into cultivation impossible.  In contrast, the dry zone possessed abundant land and 
was sparsely populated.  Agriculture in the dry zone was confined to villages supported 
by small irrigation tanks and shifting cultivation.  The potential in developing the area 
existed as large-scale ancient irrigation schemes were hardly in use. Many thousands of 
small-scale schemes that needed many small investments were also abandoned by that 
time due to lack of population and infrastructure.  Investments in irrigation were essential 
in dry zone settlement schemes as water was the most important input in bringing 
otherwise less productive land masses into productive lands. Promotion of peasant 
colonization in the dry zone was thus a logical strategy to generate employment and to 
increase food production.   
During the 1930s and 1940s the emphasis was on restoration of abandoned 
systems.  Development cost per unit of land was less due to meager costs in irrigation 
head-works development.  Land improvement and human settlement incurred were 
important as there were hardly any facilities to attract people to live in the dry zone. 
Government investments in restoring large irrigation systems and subsequent 
improvements in the quality of life in the dry zone also made the impetus for voluntary 
migration of people from the wet zone to settle in abandoned small scale systems and in 
newly established townships in the dry zone.  Rice was the main commodity grown in the 
newly developed land.   19 
Average yield of paddy in Sri Lanka in 1944 is estimated at 0.6 Mt per ha. More 
than 60 percent of the operational paddy holdings in 1946 were below 0.4 ha with 
average holding size of about 0.5 ha.  (DOCS, 1951). Low yield and large number of 
small holdings made the marketed output of rice small. Thus imported rice was the main 
source of rice for distribution in the urban districts where majority of the population had 
no access to own rice. Small volume of marketed output was easily handled by the 
domestic free market forces and thus a need for government intervention in procurement 
was not a significant issue.  Much of the demand in the market was met with rice imports 
from Burma which was also a colony of the British.  All successive governments 
seriously proclaimed the food self sufficiency as a long term policy objective. Emphasis 
on promoting rice production was a key component in the government programs. 
Edirisinghe and Poleman (1977) argued that around 90 percent of the pre-World War II 
rice supply was met through imports.  The picture changed drastically as investments in 
irrigation and agriculture continued.  Rice imports accounted only to 10 percent of the 
total rice availability in early 1980s.  
3.2.2  Government Policy towards the Provision of Basic Needs  
As discussed above, meeting the demand for rice through imports would have 
continued without much difficulty if the country did not face acute food shortages during 
the World War II.   Since the onset of the war, the colonial government experienced a 
disturbed supply of rice from the east and the resultant food shortage prompted the 
government to regulate the food distribution and storage system.   The universal rice 
rationing scheme (RSS) was initiated in 1942 to ensure equitable distribution of available 
food resources. Consumer co-operative societies with an island-wide network of retail 
shops provided an efficient base to implement the system.  In this scheme consumers 
were expected to purchase their rations through designated shops.  
Although domestic food supplies were expected to cater to a substantial share of 
the demand, the production and the marketable surplus of farmers was low and domestic 
rice procurement had not organized into an efficient market system.  This situation 
provided pre-conditions to develop the domestic agriculture, especially the rice sector.   20 
Drive of domestic food procurement was also necessary in order to improve the food 
available for distribution through the rationing system.  However, low productivity 
remained as the major obstacle to increase domestic production and production 
promotion programs had little success.  By the time of the independence in 1948 the 
burden on rice imports due to the war had reduced. The government however, continued 
the RSS thus the demand for rice from the government continued until 1979 when it was 
discontinued.  Food Stamp Scheme was the successor to the RSS and the main difference 
between the later and the former programs was that the former was targeted at the poorest 
households of the economy. The policy of the government then shifted to focus on food 
security of the country through closely monitoring the domestic production and imports.   
RSS and the Government Demand for Rice 
The government acted as a purchaser of rice while the RSS was implemented. The 
quantity demanded of rice by the government varied as the RSS was amended several 
times with respect to its targeted population and the quantity of rice eligible by different 
segments of the society.    The quantum of rice per person issued per week under the RSS 
was two measures until 1966.  The charge per measure was Rs.0.60 per measure till 1954 
and was Rs. 0.25 till 1966. The system was revised in 1966 to issue only one measure of 
free rice. As a result, the quantity of government demand generated through RSS reduced 
by 50% while the total demand for rice in the country remained around the same. The 
United Front, a coalition among three political parties formed to contest for the 1970 
general election brought a key political promise to offer two measures of rice to each 
individual. Once succeeded this was fulfilled by revising the ration scheme accordingly. 
The additional one measure was priced at one rupee per measure. Although income tax 
payers were not eligible to the free ration, the resultant decrease in demand for rice from 
the government was negligible as the income tax payers were only a small proportion of 
the population. Income tax payers however were eligible for the total quantum of rationed 
rice equally priced as that of non income tax payers. In sum, the new system demanded a 
large amount of rice to be distributed through the government channels.   Revision of the 
ration quantity in 1974 reduced the government demand while are increase in 1976 21 
increased the demand.  Similarly, discontinuation of the RSS in 1979 brought the end the 
demand for rice from the government.  
The government theoretically had two sources of supply to meet its demand for 
rice for the RSS. i.e through imports or through domestic procurement. During the pre-
independent era as well as for so many years from the independence, insufficient 
marketable surplus that arisen due to low yield and nature of small holdings was a 
constraint in realizing the domestic sources for supply of rice. On the other hand it was 
easy for the government to procure rice in the international market and distribute it 
through the designated co-operative outlets.   However, the government’s policy on the 
balance of domestic purchases and international purchases was a reflection of several 
criteria including its commitment to develop domestic agriculture and its access to 
national and international procurement of rice.   Dynamics of the international rice 
market influenced the government to shape its course of action to a larger extent. The 
government had enough foreign exchange reserves during the early years to be used in its 
international procurements. As international rice prices declined in early 1960s the 
government had the bargaining power to enter into bilateral trading agreements with 
China and Burma to secure rice in reliable quantities. During the three decades 1950-70 
the government had procured around 50 percent of the annual rice requirement from 
China and Burma.  In the early 1970s as the demand for rice increase, the government 
simultaneously had to face the international rice crisis.  Due to foreign exchange 
constraints and historically high rice prices in the world market, it was essential to 
procure more rice from the domestic market, which necessitated the establishment of the 
PMB.  Withdrawal of the government from the RSS made extensive procurement 
infrastructure redundant and was the rationale for gradual decline of the importance of 
PMB. 
3.2.3  Domestic Policies to Promote Production and Marketing 
The history of government intervention in domestic procurement runs back to 
1942 when the government introduced the Internal Purchase System (IPS) as a tool to 
meet demand of rice for RSS.  Lack of voluntary sales by farmers necessitated in August 22 
1943 to impose a rule to make it compulsory for every cultivator to sell two bushels and 
one bushel of paddy respectively from the maha and the yala harvests.  The main reason 
for this can be understood as improving procurement as the government’s access to 
international procurement was delicate.    
The IPS was replaced in 1948 by a scheme “ Marketing of Home Grown Foods”. 
The scheme was administered by the Commissioner of Marketing and was aimed at 
improving the functioning of the domestic marketing channels. Foreign exchange 
reserves during this period were at satisfactory levels. Thus the government if desired 
could continue importing rice.  However, the government had a futuristic vision in 
principle to promote domestic agriculture. Other than the promotion of production 
through several means it was in the view that marketing is also an important aspect. The 
government appointed a special committee to investigate into the marketing system and 
recommend the government appropriate policy measures. Upon the recommendations of 
the committee the guaranteed price scheme (GPS) for paddy and a number of other food 
crops was introduced in 1948. The initial policy objectives of the GPS scheme were, a) to 
assure the producers (of) fair prices and ready market for their produce, b) to stimulate 
the production of food crops consumed in the country and c) to replace food imports by 
locally produced foods with the long-term goal of food self sufficiency. Several 
government departments such as the Department of Agrarian Services, Department of 
Marketing Development and the Department of Cooperative Development were 
responsible in implementing the scheme.  During the next few years, average operational 
land holding size began to increase due to larger holdings in newly developed dry zone 
settlements and irrigation improved the quality of land and thus contributed to the yield 
increase.  National average yield based on planted area basis is estimated as 1.0 Mt per ha 
in 1951 (Aluvihare and Kikuchi, 1991).  However, prospects of improving yield through 
increased fertilizer application was meager as the rice varieties grown were not fertilizer 
responsive.  
During the first ten years since the independence, other than pursuing the strategy 
to develop land settlement schemes the governments took several measures to reduce the 23 
uncertainty attached to rice farming which in consequence was a constraint in getting 
better yields.  Paddy Lands Act of 1958 was aimed at bringing secure tenure to a large 
number of farmers. The government also vigorously promoted rice breeding and 
improvement program which produced several successful varieties belonging to the Old 
Improved Varieties category.  During the early 1960s the government was running into 
low foreign exchange reserves and shifted towards an import substitution strategy in both 
industrialization and agriculture. By this time the results of early strategy of developing 
agriculture had started paying its dividends slowly. As dynamics of the international rice 
market changed towards the benefit of the rice producers through better prices, the 
government had to look into alternative strategies in getting its rice requirement to 
continue with the RSS. One of the peculiar actions was to reduce the demand for rice 
through reducing the quantum of rations. The other was to promote domestic rice 
production and improve marketing and procurement system to benefit the domestic 
system.  In mid 1960s subsidiary food crops were also included under GPS and 
importation of potatoes, onions and chilies were banned. 
The national yield increased to 1.6 Mt/ha and the mean size of operational paddy 
lands increased to 0.8 ha while the land below 0.4 ha in size decreased to 40 percent. 
These suggests more marketable surplus available with farmers and the need for 
appropriate marketing channels for procurement and distribution of domestically 
produced rice.  The government responded this need by introducing the Domestic 
Produce Purchasing and Storage Act of 1961. 
The purpose of this act was to expedite the promotion of co-operative societies’ 
role in involvement in marketing.  Consumer cooperative societies and producer co-
operative societies were reorganized into multi-purpose cooperative societies (MPSCs) 
during the 1960s with the objective of increasing the operational efficiency through 
vertical integration.  The government through the newly established People’s Bank 
offered loans to facilitate activities of the MPCS.  Financing of new rice/paddy stores and 
paddy mills were supported through long term credit facilities. However, involvement in 
the domestic private sector in procurement and marketing was not restricted. There were 24 
many small scale enterprises involved in paddy procurement and processing as well as 
marketing of rice.  
The decade of 1960s marked the emergence of several state enterprises to 
promote non-paddy agricultural activities in the country. The establishment of the 
National Milk Board (NMB) to promote the domestic milk industry is a notable 
milestone.  The NMB was responsible in running a network of island-wide milk 
collecting and processing centers, a spray dried milk powder factory and plants to process 
milk into several products as yoghurt and ice cream. NMB’s kiosks in urban areas to 
promote milk products became famous for its red and white colored strips.  Multinational 
milk producers had to cease their distribution with introduction of foreign exchange 
restrictions and MILCO became the only producer of milk powder in the country. It also 
marked the beginning of the operations of Ceylon Fisheries Corporation and Fishery 
Harbor Corporation to promote fisheries activities.  Promotion of storage of and 
marketing of fish in inland areas through cold stores and sales outlets were also initiated 
with the objective of increasing access to sea fish in all parts of the country. 
Establishment of Paddy Marketing Board in 1971 and the resultant ending of open 
market operations in the paddy/rice market marked the dawn of a new era. 
Success of the GPS 
Farmers’ participation in the GPS was voluntary at the beginning and it was as 
low as 5% during 1948-54. (Gunawardena and Quilkey, 1987).  This has increased until 
1966 and then began to decline gradually. It should be noted here that farmers themselves 
are eligible to obtain rationed rice. Thus if a farmer decides to forego consumption of 
rationed rice he has to use his own rice and forego sale of his paddy at the GPS price.  An 
analysis based on the GPS price of paddy, the quantity and price of rationed rice using 
data from Gunawardena and Quilkey (1987) is used to explain the various degree of 
farmer participation in the GPS scheme presented in table 3.   25 
Edirisinghe and Poleman (1977) observed that the apparent per-capita annual 
consumption of rice remained at 97 kg during 1950 and 1971.   It can be argued that 
farmers had to bear more costs if they decided to forego the rationed rice during 1959 
than in 1954. Also the marketing network would have developed in 1959 than its status in 
1954. Although the reported open market price of paddy is below the price under the GPS 
farmers either had constraints in reaching the designated purchasing points or their 
produce does not meet the required quality standards of the GPS purchases.  Marketable 
surplus also increased as yield increases although the small holdings nature of paddy 
continued.  
Once the government reduced the ration quantity from two measures to one 
measure in 1966, the demand for rice from the open market increased. The government 
was the sole importer of rice and the principal reason for reducing the ration was to save 
foreign exchange and it naturally led to the reduction of imported rice.  This prompted 
consumers to meet a part of their demand through the open market.  Thus more demand 
for open market rice is evident as rice is an essential food commodity.  If the GPS price is 
below the open market price of paddy, it was more rational to a farmer to sell his produce 
in the open market.   As a result government purchases as a percentage of total rice 
production reduced substantially. Another argument presented to explain the reduction of 
his is that as rationed rice per family is reduced, farmers substitute that with own rice.  
3.2.4  Procurement in a Monopolistic Era 
Paddy Marketing Board (PMB) was established by Paddy Marketing Board Act 
No 14 of 1971 and its operations began in the first quarter of 1972 by purchasing paddy 
for the 1971/72 Maha season. The PMB was vested with monopoly powers in 
procurement and sale of paddy.   MPCSs were designated to function as sub-agents of 
PMB in procurement.  Rice was milled through private sector mills and rice was handed 
over to the Food Commissioner for distribution through the MPCSs.  The government’s 
objective in establishing the PMB was to purchase more paddy through domestic 
channels. However, it was disappointing to observe, despite the monopoly powers vested 26 
with the PMB the decline of the percentage of paddy purchased under the GPS scheme. 
(Table 4).   
 
Table 3—Farmers’ Opportunity Costs of not accepting Rationed Rice 
         Annual Cost of  











Opportunity Cost of  
not Selling Paddy to 
meet 
 







1954 0  95  95  0 57.20  83.85  - 
1959 0  95  95  0 26.00  83.85  - 
1966 47 0  47  48 0.00 0.00  42.33 
1971 47  47  95  0 52.00  48.91 - 
1973 47  47  95  0 72.80  62.89 - 
1975 24  47  71  24 104.00  115.30  58.76 
1976 24  24  47  48 52.00  57.65 116.41 
1977 24  71  95  0 156.00  172.95  - 
 
a Annual per-capita consumption is assumed as 95 kg. 
b Valued at GPS price of paddy. 
 
Table 4—Purchase under GPS (1965-74) 
 




GPS Purchases as a 
% of Total 
Production 
Remarks  
1965 36.2  21.4  58.95   
1966 45.7  28.0  61.26  Reduction  of  Ration 
quantity 
1967 54.9  13.4  24.40   
1968 64.6  15.1  23.37   
1969 65.9  13.9  21.09   
1970 77.4  26.5  34.23   
1971 66.9  32.3  48.28  Establishment  of 
PMB  
1972 62.7  26.3  41.90   
1973 62.9  22.9  36.40   
1974 76.8  20.9  27.21   
 
Source: Yoshimura et al., 1975. 
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This decline is partly explained by the price differentials presented in table 3. It 
was rational for farmers to substitute the paid ration with own rice and receive only the 
free portion of the rice ration.  Thus the government failed to procure enough amounts of 
rice and thus compelled to adopt measures in order to increase the quantity of 
procurement. 
These measures include prohibiting of storage and transportation of paddy in 
bulk. Farmers were allowed to store in his premises a quantity equal to his own produce. 
The government also increased the GPS price to Rs. 30.00 per bushel in January, 1974 
and to Rs. 33.00 per bushel in July 1974.  None of these measures proved effective in 
persuading farmers to sell paddy to the government.  It was learnt that the private sector 
participated in rice trading and consumers paid high prices for rice if they were to 
purchase rice other than the ration.  
The government simultaneously carried out a campaign to promote the domestic 
food production. A promotional campaign to substitute rice with other domestically 
available food stuffs was also in operation.  Rice meals offered in institutions and public 
eating houses were restricted to only five days a week. They were required to offer non-
rice meals on Tuesdays and Fridays.  Further aggravation of the crisis led to revise the 
ration quantum in 1973. A further revision of the quantum of free rice entitlement was 
effective from 1975.  The demand for open market rice increased and the private sector 
was allowed to operate in the market.  
During the period, purchasing other field crops through PMB was continued. The 
government played a key role in price setting of vegetables through public broadcasting 
of minimum prices for vegetables and eggs and also the marketing department operated 
purchasing centers in major producing areas.  Food remained in the mainstream of the 
agenda of political parties contested for the general election. Although the ruling party 
had no major promises, United National Party, the major opposition, had a political 
pledge to provide eight pounds of grains as a political promise. 28 
The UNP came into power in the election and a universal system to offer four lbs 
of rice and a similar quantity of wheat flour were offered to each individual. This offer 
continued through a short period as the rationing system was subjected to a drastic 
change in the following year. A relatively high producer price and the low consumer 
price caused a heavy financial burden on the government. By 1978, the expenditure on 
food subsidies was approximately 20 percent of total government expenditure. The 
revision was aimed at more targeted welfare program. Rationed rice was limited to 
households with a monthly income of equal to or less than Rs. 300.00. The RSS was 
completely replaced by a Food Stamp Scheme in 1978.  Although, there was no price 
discrimination to FSS beneficiaries rice continued to account for around 75% of the value 
of purchases under the under FSS.  The beginning of the FSS also marked the end of an 
era with high government involvement in the food procurement and distribution system.   
Change of the government policy on food rationing greatly reduced the need for 
the government to procure rice to meet its distribution needs. Although the PMB 
continued its operations, it no more had to play its original functions.  
 
3.2.5  Government Policies after 1977  
The changes of the government policy towards economic liberalization included 
promotion of private sector. The policy regime after 1977 is a one promoting 
liberalization. This regime promoted reducing protection and subsidies, reducing tariff 
and relaxation of quota restrictions. Multiple exchange rate system practiced before 1977 
was converted to a unified system.   Many State Owned Enterprises were subjected to 
liquidation or conversion into public companies.  Initially, the state retained the majority 
shareholding due to management interests. Public were allowed to purchase shares of 
new enterprises through public share offers.   These controlling stakes were later sold to 
private sector through competitive bidding. We discuss in this section the changes made 
to enterprises with an importance to agricultural marketing and distribution.  29 
Marketing Department  
The government decided to discontinue the facilitative and distribution functions 
of the Marketing Department. The department’s fruit processing facility was converted 
into a government owned company (Lanka Canneries Limited). This was expected to 
continue fruit processing under the popular MD brand.  The facility maintained strong 
backward linkages with domestic farmers through MD’s collection centers in major 
growing areas. Under the privatization of state owned enterprises, a 60% stake of the 
shares of the company was offered to the private sector through all or non basis and 30 
percent on public share issue. The successful bidder from the domestic private sector paid 
Rs. 102.5 Million to undertake the management. This change in hands of management led 
to discontinue backward linkages with domestic farmers as the new management 
considered it more advantageous to import the raw material for processing. As indicated 
by Kelegama (1997), the new management of Lanka Canneries imported tomato pulp and 
puree from India by discontinuing the practices of the old management of the company 
and its predecessor, the Marketing Department. The government policy of not running the 
state owned enterprises led to relinquish bakery and the kitchen division of the marketing 
department which was responsible for supply of food to institutional sector such as the 
hospitals and the prison etc. 
Prima Ceylon and Wheat Flour Distribution 
Another important landmark was the arrangement between the government and 
Prima Ceylon Limited, a subsidiary of a Singapore based company to mill wheat grain. 
The company made the capital investment for the milling and storage complex in 
Trincomalee, one of the three major ports in the country.  The agreement was initially on 
Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) basis and was expected to expire in year 1999. 
According to the agreement, the government would continue to be the sole importer of 
wheat grain and the company agreed to provide back to the Food Commissioner, a 
quantity of flour equivalent to 74 percent of the imported wheat grain and to retain the 30 
rest of the produce and by- products as a fee to its services. CWE distributed flour 
through MPCSs on behalf of the Food Commissioner.  
The agreement was revised in 2001 into Build Operate and Own (BOO) basis, 
thus the company continued to operate the flour mill.  The flour and wheat imports were 
liberalized and wheat flour is imported by other private sector companies today.  Prima 
Ceylon limited began to diversify its operations into feed manufacturing and later into 
bakery products and into running a chain of retail stores.  Since the liberalization of flour 
distribution Prima Mills distributes floor through a network of agents of which many 
participants are MPCSs.  Prima also began branding its flour differentiated by the 
prospective end product.  
Wheat flour availability in the market has substantial implications on rice demand 
in the country.   Sri Lankan government gets a part of its wheat requirement through PL 
480 agreement with the US government. According to the existing arrangements CWE 
has to pay to the government for PL 480 shipments. CWE was able to generate a profit 
through its flour trading till 1993. A wheat flour subsidy was introduced in 1994 so wheat 
price in the market is below the cost. This is an untargeted subsidy and wheat used for 
other purposes such as producing cakes and biscuits and premium bread which is usually 
consumed by up-market consumers all get the subsidy. 
National Milk Board and Re-Entry of Nestle 
In the early years of liberalization once the milk powder imports were liberalized, 
the government through public share offer and its equity capital formed Lanka Milk 
Foods (CWE) to handle importation and packaging of milk powder.  51 per cent 
controlling stake of the company was later sold to the private sector. NMB was converted 
to a company called MILCO and its distribution system was handed over to individual 
operators.   Nestle entered back the country through Nestle (Lanka) and began operations 
through out-growers and processing of dried milk powder.  Nestle also purchased the 
condensed milk factory operated by NMB. 31 
Liberalizing the Rice Sector  
Rice and other major food items were imported by the Food Department upon 
advise from the Ministry of Agriculture who decided the import requirement based on 
production forecasts of the year. The imported rice was distributed through CWE, MPCS 
and private wholesalers. The role played by the government through the Food 
Commissioner and the CWE as the sole importer of rice also changed when the private 
sector companies were allowed to import rice since 1988.  This was based on licensing 
and a strict quota system through bondsmen. The quota was decided according to the 
deficit of the domestic demand after considering the domestic production and food 
security concerns of the country. Rice importation was initially offered to three off-shore 
companies (Rassas and Fitch, 1991).  These companies were allowed to import rice and 
store in the Food Department warehouses leased at commercial rates. Stocks were 
released to the market according to the requirement of the country and the duty was 
charged at the point of selling rice to the local market. Bondsmen were allowed to re-
export rice without paying duty.  There were 10 registered companies under the system 
by 1995 and only eight of these were active in the trade (Shilpi, 1995). According to the 
authors bondsmen had little incentives to operate at the tariff and the conditions of 
operation in effect in 1995. By 1995, the government decided to liberalize rice imports. 
Licensing system was abolished and the tariff rate of 35% was in effect. The rate was 
then revised to 20% in 1995. Rice imports were brought under a licensing scheme again 
on 30th August 1996.  
After 1995 this rate of tariff remained unchanged in principle but waivers were 
granted at different rates in specified periods to curtail increasing prices in the domestic 
market due to production shortages in the market.  However, these duty waivers were not 
administered by the government vigilantly so sudden increases of imports during short 
duty waiver periods were well evident. One such incidence is the reduction of tariff 
during the 4
th quarter of 1999.  It is observed that 2/3 of the total quantity of rice imported 
during the year was under the duty reduction facility.  The resultant decrease in prices of 
imported rice resulted in non-purchase of paddy by local millers causing difficulties to 32 
millers and producers.  Subsequently, the government intervened through CWE to 
purchase paddy (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2001) 
Domestic Procurement Sector in the era of Liberalization 
In the domestic procurement, the government policy was not anyway promoting 
the PMB but its presence had been useful at a few instances.  The UNP government in 
1977 increased the GP of paddy to Rs. 40.00 per bushel.  The resultant supply increased 
procurement during the August harvest. This momentum was continued in the following 
year making the PMB to purchase 36% of the production.  Since then PMB purchases 
began to decline.  PMB purchases accounted on average for less than five percent of the 
total production in normal years for the period 1980-90. Exceptions are observed in 1983, 
1989 and 1990. These three years are important as year 1983 is the year of the 
referendum held to extend the tenure of the government in power while the latter two 
years, the civil disturbances in principal rice growing districts may have virtually stopped 
the operations of PMB. Annual average of PMB purchases were only 1.3 percent for the 
period 1991-93.  Around 1991, the government began to hand over PMB facilities 
situated in different parts of the country to other activities so it was lacking essential 
infrastructure to up scale its operations. 
During 1994, the year of the general election and the year in which farmers 
complained about prolonged low prices of paddy, the party in power was defeated in the 
general election. With the directives of the new government PMB intensified its 
purchases recording its purchases as 5% of the total production.  Much of these purchases 
were for the yala crop of which the harvesting season came soon after the election.   In 
the following year PMB purchases increased to 10 percent of the total production. It is 
argued that subsequent sale of this procured paddy brought heavy financial losses. PMB 
operations were terminated in 1996.  During the period of inactivity/non existence of the 
PMB, the government had to intervene frequently in the procurement of paddy through 
its apparatus such as the CWE, Co-Ops and through release of finances to farmer 
organizations through government agents.  33 




An assessment of the impacts of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) is of primary importance for a net food importing 
country like Sri Lanka in formulating policies to mitigate adverse impacts, if any, and as 
preparation for negotiations at the upcoming trade rounds.  The objective of this chapter 
is to analyze the commitments with AoA and to assess the likely impact of AoA on the 
Sri Lankan economy in terms of production, trade and prices of food crops and food 
security. 
The chapter is organized as follows.  First, it provides an overview of AoA. 
Second, it presents the commitments made by Sri Lanka.  The next section shows the 
possible impacts on the Sri Lankan economy, with a special emphasis on imports and 
food security.  The chapter ends with a summary and conclusion of the findings. 
4.1.1  World Trade Organization 
Since 1948, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) had provided the 
general rules and regulations for the global trading system.  Over the years, GATT 
evolved through several rounds of negotiations (Table 5).  The latest and largest round 
was the Uruguay round which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and led to the creation of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  Whereas GATT had mainly dealt with trade in 
goods, WTO and its agreements now cover trade in services, and traded inventions, 
creations and designs (intellectual property). 
At present, WTO is the only international body dealing with the rules of trade 
between nations.  At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk 
of the world’s trading nations.  These documents provide the legal ground-rules for 
international commerce.  They are essentially contracts, binding governments to keep 
their trade policies within agreed limits.  Although negotiated and signed by 34 
governments, the ultimate goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters and 
importers conduct their business. 
Table 5—The GATT Trade Rounds 
 
Year  Place/Name  Subjects Covered  Number of Participating 
Countries 
1947 Geneva  Tariffs  23 
1949 Annecy  Tariffs  13 
1951 Torquay  Tariffs  38 
1956 Geneva  Tariffs  26 
1960-1961 Geneva  (Dillan  Round)  Tariffs  26 
1964-1967  Geneva (Kennedy Round)  Tariffs and anti-dumping measures  62 
1973-1979  Geneva (Tokyo Round)  Tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
“framework” agreements 
102 
1986-1994  Geneva (Uruguay Round)  Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, 
services, intellectual property, 
dispute settlement, textiles, 
agriculture, creation of WTO etc. 
123 
 
4.1.2  AoA and Uruguay Round 
The original GATT applied to agricultural trade, but it contained loopholes.  For 
example, it allowed countries to use some non-tariff measures such as import quotas, and 
also to use subsidies.  As a result, agricultural trade became highly distorted, especially 
with the use of export subsidies which would normally not have been allowed for 
industrial products.  The Uruguay round agreement is a significant first step towards 
order, fair competition and a less distorted agricultural sector. 
The objective of the AoA is to reform trade in the sector and to make policies 
more market-oriented.  The new rules and commitments apply to market access, domestic 
support and export subsidies. 
Market Access (Article 4) 
The new rule for market access in agricultural products is tariffs only.  All the 
non-tariff barriers have been replaced by tariffs that provide more-or-less equivalent 35 
levels of protection.  The process of converting non-tariff barriers into tariff is called 
tariffication. 
The package ensures that quantities imported before the agreement took effect 
could continue to be imported, and it guarantees that some new quantities are charged 
duty rates that are not prohibitive.  This is achieved by a system of “tariff-quotas”—lower 
tariff rates for specified quantities that exceed the quota.   
The newly committed tariffs and tariff quotas, covering all agricultural products 
took effect in 1995.  Developed countries would cut the tariff by an average of 36% in 
equal steps over six years.  Developing countries would make 24% cuts over 10 years.  
They have the option of offering ceiling tariff rates in cases where duties were not bound.   
Least developed countries do not have to cut their tariffs at all. 
In addition, for products whose non-tariff restrictions have been converted to 
tariffs, governments are allowed to take special emergency actions (safeguards) in order 
to prevent swiftly falling prices or surges in imports from hurting domestic farmers. 
Domestic Support (Article 6) 
AoA attempts to reduce subsidies and other programs, including those that raise 
or guarantee farm-gate prices and farmers’ incomes.  The AoA distinguishes between 
support programs that stimulate production directly, and those that are considered to have 
no direct effect.  The direct support provided is measured using Total Aggregate 
Measurement Support (AMS) for the agricultural sector per year in the base year of 1986-
1988. 
Developed countries would reduce AMS by 20% over six years.  Developing 
countries would make 13% cuts over 10 years.  Least developed countries do not have to 
cut their support. 
Measures with minimum impact on trade, which are in the “green box” can be 
used freely.  They include government services such as research, disease control, infra-36 
structure, food security, direct income transfers to farmers, assistance to help farmers 
restructure agriculture, and direct payments under environmental and regional assistance 
programs.  Also permitted are direct payments to farmers to limit production, government 
assistance programs to encourage agricultural and rural development in developing 
countries, and small scale support (5% or less in developed countries and 10% or less for 
developing countries from the total value of the product).   
Export Subsidies (Article 9)  
AoA attempts to cut down export subsidies which are used to make exports 
artificially competitive.  Taking averages for 1986-1990 as the base level, developed 
countries have agreed to cut the value of export subsidies by 36% over six years starting 
in 1995 and developing countries have agreed for 24% over 10 years.  Developed 
countries have also agreed to cut the quantities of subsidized exports by 21% over six 
years starting in 1995 and developing countries have agreed for 14% over 10 years.  
Least developed countries do not need to make any cuts. 
During the 6-year implementation period, developed countries are allowed, under 
certain conditions, to use subsidies to reduce the cost of marketing and transporting 
exports. 
 
Table 6—Numerical Targets for Cutting Subsidies and Protection Agreed in the 
Uruguay Round 
 
  Developed countries 
6 years: 1995-2000 
Developing countries 
10 years: 1995-2004. 
Tariff 
Average cut for all agricultural products 














Value of subsidies 
Subsidized quantities 








Note: The base level of the tariff cut was the bound rate before 1 January 1995; or, for unbounded tariffs, 
the actual rate charged in September 1986 when the Uruguay round began. 37 
4.1.3  AoA and Special and Differential Treatment 
It can be predicted that, based on the above discussion, that the impact of the AoA 
is more significant for consumers and consumption policies in net food-importing 
countries.   To alleviate the burden on the food import bill and balance of payments and 
to enhance the capacity of developing countries in increasing their agricultural production 
capacity in order to reduce the high dependence on imports, the following special 
measures on food security were included in the AoA.   These concerns were formulated 
first, in Article 20 of AoA negotiated during the Uruguay round, and were reaffirmed in 
the Doha declaration, confirming that special and differential treatment will be granted to 
developed countries, “to effectively take account of their development needs, including 
food security and rural development” (Healy et al.,. 1998): 
(a)  Augmenting the provision of food aid by reviewing the level of food aid and 
providing increasing amounts under grant terms. 
(b)  Promises for full consideration of requests for financial and technical 
assistance to improve agricultural productivity and infrastructure. 
(c)  “Appropriate provision” for differential terms with respect to export credits. 
(d)  Short-term assistance in financing normal imports from international financial 
institutions under existing facilities, or those established in the context of 
adjustment programs. 
Several developing countries have presented their concerns about food security 
issues, including the possibility of special and differential treatment embedded in a 
“Development Box” or a “Food Security Box.” 
According to the AOA’s requirement for the continuation of agricultural trade 
reform process, negotiations began in 2000. After the Ministerial conference in Doha in 
November 2001, talks on agriculture are scheduled to end by 1 January 2005. Based on 
the proposals submitted by members, the chairman of the agriculture committee of the 
WTO prepared the draft modalities for the negotiations.  38 
4.2  COMMITMENTS MADE BY SRI LANKA 
Although AoA lays out the basic rules and definitions regarding policy making, it 
does not include within it, specific quantitative commitments on a country-by-country 
and commodity-by-commodity basis.  Such quantitative commitments are stipulated in 
the country schedules, that each signatory to the agreement has been required to submit.  
The country schedules comprise a statement by each member government, on a 
commodity-by-commodity basis, of their position on each of the issues concerned (tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, domestic support and export subsidies) prior to the 
implementation of the provisions by the agreement, together with an outline of how the 
provisions will be achieved.  The following section describes the position of Sri Lanka 
regarding the commitments. 
4.2.1  Position of the Trade Policies 
The agricultural sector in Sri Lanka was substantially liberalised prior to the 
adoption of the AoA due to economic reforms programs led by the World Bank and the 
IMF. In fact, the agricultural sector in Sri Lanka was more liberalised than what was 
required under Sri Lanka’s AoA commitments at the Uruguay Round negotiations in 
1994. Therefore, it was not necessary to reduce any of the assistance or protection 
provided to the agriculture sector. 
Tariffs 
Sri Lanka has bound around 99% of the tariff lines of the agricultural products at 
50% and the remaining 1% of the tariff lines are 175%, 60%, 45%, 40%, 20%, 10% and 
5% ad-velorum and 60% non-ad-velorum.  However, at present, applied tariff rates of 
many items are as low as 25%, 10% and 2% except for a very few items. Specific duties 
have been introduced to some sensitive products such as potatoes, big onions, red onions, 
cowpea and green gram recently to protect domestic farmers. At present specific duty is 
imposed on importation of rice of Rs. 5-6 per kg. In the past it has been revised upwards 39 
during peak harvesting periods and downwards during lean periods, to protect large 
community of rice farmers.  
Sri Lanka identified about 75% to 50% of tariff lines which are covered under 
AoA as ‘import-sensitive’ tariff lines and within that category some products, as ‘special 
products’ based on whether they affect food security, rural development and or livelihood 
security concerns. No tariff reduction commitments are applied for those products in their 
schedules of commitments. Rate of reduction (tariff cut) for import-sensitive items are 
lower than those for the balance items.  Base rate for reduction is the bound rate for all 
products and tariff cut will be in equal annual installments over 10 years and the year of 
commencement would be the year one of the implementation period. 
Import Licenses 
At present Sri Lanka does not have license control for agriculture items other than 
for plant quarantine purposes.  However, in some instances in the past, (July 2000) 
licensing was imposed temporarily to control falling domestic paddy prices due to the 
bumper paddy harvests. Later this licensing requirement was replaced by a specific duty. 
Even though AoA requires all non-tariff barriers to be converted into tariff barriers and 
import licensing schemes could also be actionable policies, such market access provisions 
do not apply when the commodity in question is a traditional staple of a developing 
country.  As a result, in Sri Lanka, the import licensing scheme on rice can be exempted.   
4.2.2  Position of Domestic Agricultural Policies 
AoA urges countries to quantify all domestic support, i.e., creation of AMS. Most 
of the domestic agricultural policies implemented by Sri Lanka either fall into the green 
box or the blue box and are therefore exempted from AMS calculation.  Sri Lanka did not 
report outlays on “trade-distorting” support measures as captured by AMS, and thus 
committed itself to limiting support to 10% of the value of production under the De 
Minimis rule. It also did not report outlays on development measures, but has the right to 
claim this exemption for such measures in the future, if necessary (FAO, 2000).      40 
The De Minimis provision allows a country to be exempt from reduction 
commitments and the exception is given when the support does not exceed 10% of the 
value of production of a basic product (in the case of product-specific support), or of the 
value of total agricultural production (in the case of non-product specific domestic 
support).  The incentives which do not fall under the green or blue box category fall into 
this category. Furthermore, subsidies to poor farmers are exempted, and if the subsidy 
helps in improving land management, it will be exempted.  
As a result, Sri Lanka does not have to cut down on any existing production 
subsidies.  The following section explains the position for each policy. 
Fertilizer Subsidy 
Sri Lanka introduced a fertilizer subsidy scheme in 1994 and in October 1997 it 
was confined to urea only. This subsidy fixed the price of urea in the domestic market 
and the difference between the imported price and the domestic price was given by the 
government to the importer as a subsidy. However, due to commitments with donor 
agencies like the World Bank and the limitation of budgetary allocations, this subsidy 
scheme was changed to a fixed subsidy rate allowing the market to determine the price 
according to world market prices. As subsidies to poor farmers are exempted, Sri Lanka 
does not need to eliminate the fertilizer subsidy due to commitments with AoA.   
Water Subsidy 
Development of large irrigation schemes is one of the major policy instruments 
used by successive Sri Lankan governments to achieve food self-sufficiency.  At present, 
the government handles the maintenance and operation of these facilities. Because such 
expenditure falls under “land improvement” it is exempted from AoA commitments.  
However, the recent water policy document involves transferring management of water 
resources to farmer organizations; and as a result, subsidy on maintenance and 
management will be eliminated despite this exemption. 41 
Guaranteed Price Scheme 
Sri Lanka had guaranteed price schemes for paddy until 1996, but the purchases 
under that scheme were very small.  At present there is no guaranteed price for paddy or 
any other crop. However, governments regularly announce recommended price levels for 
the purchase of paddy and some government agencies, such as cooperatives, purchase 
paddy at the recommended rate. However, such purchases are on a very small scale and 
always less than even 5% of the domestic production.  Deficiency payments categorized 
under Blue Box subsidies recognized as a useful tool to bridge the gap between low 
market prices and recommended minimum prices, especially in rice.   
Concessionary Credit  
State and domestic commercial banks provide cultivation loans at concessionary 
rates under the New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme operated by the government. 
Generally 65% to 75% of the total allocated credit is granted to paddy farmers. However 
institutional credit to paddy farmers is only about 2%- 3% of the total credit requirement 
for paddy cultivation and the total credit requirement is largely met by informal sources. 
Even though subsidies to poor farmers are exempted from AoA commitments, Sri Lanka 
does not use these provisions to the benefit of majority of poor farmers due to budget 
constraints. 
Sri Lanka will maintain the provisions under article 6.2 dealing with special and 
differential subsidies, enhance the provision given by the chairman of WTO, such as 
subsidies for concessional loans through established credit institutions or the 
establishment of regional and community credit cooperatives, transportation subsidies for 
agricultural products and farm inputs to remote areas, government assistance for the 
establishment and operation of agricultural cooperatives, government assistance for risk 
management of agricultural producers and savings instruments to reduce year-to-year 
variations in farm incomes which are excluded when calculating the  AMS. 42 
Research and Extension 
Like other developing and developed countries, Sri Lanka has been investing in 
agricultural research and extension services.  AoA considers these as green box policies 
and are therefore exempted
2. However, governments are encouraged by AoA to promote 
demand-driven research in agriculture to enable private sector participation in research 
and extension services.   
Plant Quarantine Service 
This confirms to green box criteria.  These services are provided free of charge in 
order to restrict imports of noxious plants and animals that may infect and affect the 
domestic flora and fauna. 
Seed Certification Service 
This also confirms to green box criteria.  These services are provided, for a 
modest f0ee, to farmers who produce seeds and planting materials and are aimed at 
ensuring the quality of the material produced. 
 
Crop Development Fund 
Through cess raised on export crops, development activities are supported in tea, 
rubber and coconut smallholdings and research activities on other plantation crops. As 
the government does not make any contribution to the cess fund, these programs are 
exempt from reduction commitments. 
Some of the agricultural policies implemented by Sri Lankan governments will be 
down-scaled and in future be completely eliminated, mainly due to commitments with 
                                                 
2 Under Green Box measures (permissible provisions of Annex 2 of AoA), important measures for Sri 
Lanka under the National Policy on Agriculture and Livestock 2003-2010 include provisions such as: 
general services (research, extension, advisory, training, marketing promotion, infrastructure services, etc.); 
public stockholdings for food security purposes; domestic food aid; direct payment; payment for relief from 
natural disasters; payment under regional assistance programs. 43 
donor agencies, even though such policies can be maintained under commitments with 
AoA.   
4.2.3  Position of Export Subsidies 
Sri Lanka did not have any subsidy programs other than subsidies to reduce the 
cost of marketing of agricultural product exports (air freight subsidy to fruit and 
vegetable products) as identified under the export subsidy commitment (article 9.1 (d), 
(e)). However, due to lack of funds, these programs were not continued.  Sri Lanka did 
not have export subsidies in the base period 1986-1988 and hence did not declare any 
export subsidies in its schedule.   
The export incentives provided by the Sri Lanka Export Development Board 
(SLEDB) and BOI are exempted.  Some examples are: 
(i)  Transport and marketing subsidies on exports of developing countries are 
exempt from the AoA commitment.  Export subsidy on cut flowers is 
exempted as it is a freight subsidy.  
(ii)  The SLEDB assists new exporters in non-traditional agricultural activities 
with grants of up to 3% of the FOB value during the first year of operation. 
They are also eligible in principle to use the refinancing facilities operated by 
the Central Bank and seed capital for new ventures provided by the SLEDB, 
as well as income tax exemption and customs duty waiver on intermediate 
goods imports under the Board of Investment (BOI). With the exception of a 
few large companies involved in the sea-food industry and horticulture. All 
subsidies on non-plantation export crops amount to less than 1 per cent of 
export earnings from the designated products (Athukorale and Kalegama, 
1996) are hence exempted. 
(iii)  Export subsidies given to the tea exports sector by the Tea Board which 
include a 50% in interest rate subsidy on loans obtained for the purchase of 
machinery for manufacture of tea bags (Athukorala and Kelegama, 1996) are 44 
also exempted.  In 1992, the total value of these subsidies (Rs 26 million) 
amounted to less than 0.5% of the total value of processed tea exports.  
(iv)  Subsidies given by the SLEDB to exporters of fresh fruits and vegetables on 
imported packing materials (Athukorala and Kalegama, 1996) are exempted. 
4.2.4  Special and Differential Treatment 
Sri Lanka supports the draft ministerial declaration that developing countries 
should continue to enjoy benefits from special and differential treatment provisions. It 
also supports the concerns of net food-importing countries in the draft ministerial 
declaration.    
Proposals submitted by Sri Lanka along with other developing countries for the 
creation of a ‘development box’ focus on measures that would enhance food security and 
safeguard the livelihoods of rural communities. 
•  The main element of the proposal was to protect staple food crops, which provide 
the main livelihood for low income and resource-poor farmers. These should be 
exempted from the further reductions due to commitments under AoA. 
•  The proposal suggested that as a special and differential measure, developing 
countries at or below the de minimus level of allowed domestic support, should 
be allowed to maintain an ‘appropriate’ tariff binding on their food-security 
crops. It means allowing an increase in bound rates if current bindings do not 
provide effective protection for such food-security crops. 
•  It also suggested that article 6.2 of AoA should be expanded to include an array 
of measures of assistance geared towards addressing food security, and for 
preserving the viability of rural employment. 45 
4.3  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PADDY/RICE SECTOR IN SRI LANKA 
AoA was not expected to result in significant changes in world production of rice 
but the volume of trade was expected to rise by 5%, largely because of the market access 
commitments by Japan and the Republic of Korea (FAO, 1999). Hence, the impact of 
AoA commitments on rice markets in Sri Lanka mainly depends on the commitments 
made by Sri Lanka.  As shown earlier, Sri Lanka has already eliminated the import-
licensing scheme, and the only commitment will be to reduce tariff.  The current policy is 
to regulate rice imports by changing specific duty upwards and downwards within the 
bound rate during peak harvesting periods and lean periods. It is expected that rice will be 
included as a special product under the import-sensitive category. For such products tariff 
reductions are not applicable or minimal.  Domestic support and export subsidy 
commitments are based on the base levels of such support during the 1986-1988 period 
and Sri Lanka did not have any trade distorting programs during this period. 
 
 




Since independence, successive Sri Lankan governments have provided constant 
support to the rice/paddy sector, to ensure adequate income for farmers, to provide rice at 
a low price to urban consumers, and to stabilize rice and paddy prices.  As a result of 
these interventions, Sri Lanka has achieved near self-sufficiency in rice.  However, some 
of the original objectives of these policies have not been fully achieved—many farmers 
do not earn an adequate income from paddy, Sri Lankan consumers pay higher prices for 
rice compared to world market prices, and the stability of local paddy and rice prices are 
not very different from those of the world market. 
This chapter focuses on the impacts of government interventions in the rice sector 
in Sri Lanka with a special emphasis on the rice/paddy marketing activities carried out by 46 
the government and private sectors.  The specific objectives are (i) to investigate the 
impact of rice-trade liberalization on prices, supply and demand of rice and paddy, rice 
imports and calorie intake, and (ii) to investigate the impact of the government paddy 
procurement program on supply, demand and prices. 
Based on the results, which were obtained using an econometrically estimated 
partial equilibrium model, this study supports rice-trade liberalization because this 
strategy will decrease rice prices, which is directly beneficial to consumers, as it 
increases calorie consumption. It is therefore argued that the government should 
minimize or eliminate import restrictions and encourage private sector importation of 
rice. However, at the same time, it is also argued that the government should increase its 
presence in paddy procurement and thereby ensure that the interests of small-scale 
farmers (belonging to one of the lowest income groups in the country) are protected.   
This chapter is organized into seven sections. The introduction sets out the 
objectives of the study. This is followed by discussions on the status of the rice sector and 
the development of domestic marketing and trade policies related to the rice sector. The 
next section explains the conceptual model, followed by a section on the empirical model 
and data.  The next two sections explain the econometric and simulation results.  The 
final section is devoted to conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
5.2  RICE/PADDY SECTOR IN SRI LANKA 
5.2.1 Economic  Significance 
The rice sector occupies a key position in the economy of Sri Lanka.  During the 
1996-2000 periods this sector contributed on the average 22% to the agricultural GDP of 
the country, while the total contribution from the agricultural sector to the national GDP 
was 20%. Currently, Sri Lanka is 96% self sufficient in rice, which is the staple food of 
the country (Figure 6). Though declining, the agricultural sector still absorbs 32.6% of 
the labor force of the country (Central Bank, 2001). Out of this agricultural labor force, 
the paddy sector employs about 50%.     47 
Figure 6—Trends in the Rice Sector of Sri Lanka, 1961-2000 
 
Paddy continues to hold its primary position as the crop with the largest cultivated 
extent among all crops grown in the country.  About 850,000 ha of land in all parts of the 
country is under paddy cultivation. Paddy is the principal contributor to the rural 
economy in the country because the majority of rural households engage not only in 
production but also marketing of rice as their main or additional source of livelihood. 
5.2.2  Efficiency of Paddy Production 
More than 70% of paddy holdings are less than 1 ha and only about 5% of farmers 
have a holding size of greater than 2 ha.  The income earned from paddy is not sufficient 
to meet basic needs of a family and poverty is prevalent among paddy farmers, especially 
those who cultivate on a small scale (Ranaweera et al., 1990; Gunawardena, 2000; 
Weerahewa et al., 2003).  According to Shilipi (1995), Domestic Resource Costs 
(DRCs)—a measure of comparative advantage—is 1.73 for the maha season (major 







































PRODUCTION IMPORTS STOCK CHANGES TOTAL SUPPLY48 
paddy in Sri Lanka.  Rafeek and Samarathunage (2000) also indicate that $ 1 of resources 
is used to produce only 56 cents worth of rice valued in terms of foreign exchange.  
However, Wijayaratna et al. (1996) show that when irrigation and land costs were not 
taken into account, there is a comparative advantage in growing paddy in 1993.  Also, 
Kikuchi et al. (2000 and 2001) state that though comparative advantage in paddy farming 
has been declining over the years, Sri Lanka still has a comparative advantage in growing 
paddy under major irrigation schemes.  Also, according to Abeyratna et al. (1990) there 
is still a comparative advantage in growing paddy under certain circumstances. 
According to them the DRC is 0.88 when irrigation costs can be limited to rehabilitation 
costs for Kalawewa, Polonnaruwa, Hambantota, Anuradhapura, Kurunegala, and Kegalle 
districts.  They also indicate that productivity and border price are the most sensitive 
variables affecting DRC. Weerahewa et al. (2003a) and Thibbotuwawa (2004) showed 
that there is a comparative advantage in growing paddy only when it is cultivated on 
large scale. 
5.2.3 Rice/Paddy  Marketing 
The private sector handles nearly 80% of the marketing functions in the rice-trade 
system in Sri Lanka. The role of the government in paddy purchasing activities has been 
declining over the years (Figure 7). At the farm level, a number of private entrepreneurs 
are involved in purchasing paddy. These are the assembly agents, brokers, small 
operators and rice millers. The assemblers are the primary buyers of paddy and are often 
referred to as collectors. Some of them are paddy producers, input suppliers, and grocery 
traders. Many paddy assemblers are located in paddy producing areas and only a very 
few hold stocks due to lack of storage facilities and finances. These assembly agents 
distribute the stocks of paddy to millers who are located in different parts of the country. 
Some of these millers stock paddy and mill it at a later stage. The amount of paddy milled 
usually depends on the price of rice.  The wholesale rice dealers in the Colombo market 
play a major role within this distribution system. They operate under a commission basis 
as well as on a direct buying system from millers. They also sell rice to retailers. In 
addition to the distribution function, wholesalers are also centrally involved in making 49 
advance payments to suppliers, bulk breaking to match the demand, keeping suppliers 
and distributors informed about the prices, and supplying trading finance (Somaratne, 
1987). The Colombo wholesale market handles about 60% of the total rice supply in the 
country. The importance of the Colombo market has declined significantly in the recent 
past because millers increasingly supply to wholesalers and retailers directly—bypassing 
the wholesale market. After rice stocks reach the wholesale market, wholesalers sell rice 
to retailers in every part of the country. 
Figure 7—Changes in the Paddy Procurement Scheme, 1970-2000 
 
5.2.4  Rice/ Paddy Price Stability 
Comparisons made among different price series using monthly average producer 
prices, average retail and wholesale prices of different grades of rice for the period 1991-
2001, obtained from HARTI (Hector Kobbakaduwa Agrarian Research and Training 
Institute) publications show that the stability in rice and paddy prices as explained by the 
coefficient of variation is approximately 20% (Table 7). Figures 8 and 9, respectively 
depict long-term trends of nominal price and real price of samba rice (par-boiled rice), 
farm-gate price of short-grain paddy and f.o.b. price of Thai rice. 
The stability of rice prices in the world market depends on the country of origin. 

























































States Agency for International Development (USAID) 2002 show that the coefficient of 
variation is smaller for f.o.b. prices in India when compared with those of Thailand.
3   
 










          
Wholesale  Samba Rice I  23.56  4.75  20.16 
Retail  Samba Rice I  26.42  4.91  18.58 
Wholesale Kora  Rice  I  18.14  3.98  21.94 
Retail Kora  Rice  I  20.82  4.34 20.84 
Wholesale   Nadu Rice I  17.87  4.17  23.31 
Retail  Nadu Rice I  20.54  4.56  22.22 
Wholesale Raw  red  rice  18.82  4.48  23.80 
Retail Raw  red  rice  21.63  4.95 22.89 
Wholesale  Raw white rice  17.01  4.01  23.59 
Retail  Raw white rice  19.63  4.45  22.66 
Farm gate  Short grain paddy  10.51  1.99  18.92 
Farm gate  Long grain paddy  8.94  1.99  22.26 
Thailand   5% broken rice  15.04  3.27  21.75 
Thailand   15%broken rice  14.06  3.16  22.49 
Vietnam   10%broken rice  15.34  2.03  13.22 
India  10%broken rice  18.23  1.12    6.17 
Pakistan 10%broken  rice  15.28  1.56  10.24 
 
                                                 
3 Monthly f.o.b. prices in India were available for the period 1977-2000, and hence the coefficient of 
variation was calculated for all the series for this period too.  It was found that coefficient of variation is 
around 13% for all the series. 51 
Figure 8—Nominal Prices of Samba Rice  
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5.2.5 Rice  Consumption 
Rice is the staple food in Sri Lanka.  The average consumption of rice was 95.15 
kg/year/person in 2000 (Food Balance Sheets, 2002). Rice provides the predominant 
source of calories in Sri Lanka. It is also a major source of protein for the majority of the 
population. A majority of consumers spend a considerable portion of their income on 
rice. Findings of the Consumer Finance and Socio-economic Survey, conducted by the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka, reveal that the expenditure on rice as a percentage of total 
food expenditure in 1981/82 and 1996/97 was 28.3% and 20.4%, respectively.  For lower 
income groups the percentage expenditure on rice is even higher. According to the same 
survey, approximately one fifth of the total population consumed below 1,800 kcal per 
day. Continuing disparities in nutritional intake among different sectors of the economy; 
i.e., urban, rural and estate sectors is evident (Table 8). Although there are indications 
that the nutritional status of the lowest 10% income group improved over the recent past, 
the nutritional status of middle and low-income groups deteriorated further as they began 
to spend more on non-food items.  
Table 8—Per capita Calorie Consumption in Different Sectors 
 
 Survey All  sectors  Urban  Rural  Estate 
1969/70 2264  2161 2268  2459 
1973 1936  1957  1837  2345 
1978/79 2283  2240 2230  2763 
1980/81 2271  2001 2210  2122 
1981/82 2105  2229 2246  2639 
1990/91 -  - 2103 2473 
 
Source: Rathnayake, 1998. 
 
5.2.6  Trade and Marketing Policies in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka has an extensive experience in pursuing a variety of trade and domestic 
marketing policies to develop the rice/paddy sector. During the years immediately 
following independence, governments had relatively few problems in importing food as 
satisfactory foreign exchange reserves were available. Nevertheless, the political 53 
leadership of the country supported and encouraged investments in major agricultural 
development as a long-term strategy.  As returns from investments in agriculture began to 
bear results, purchasing food from domestic markets to replace a part of the government’s 
imports became a viable option. Governments also nurtured cooperative societies as a 
policy because they supported the government intention of distributing 
rationed/subsidized food. Because cooperative societies had a network that penetrated all 
parts of the island, they also provided support, at least in principle, to the government’s 
drive to purchase domestically produced food. 
The first-ever involvement of the government in purchasing domestically 
produced food commodities was offered on a voluntary basis from the supplier’s side in 
1948. The Guaranteed Price Scheme (GPS) introduced in 1948 had the main objective of 
providing an assured market for rice and twelve other locally produced commodities. 
Government departments and cooperative societies were involved in implementing the 
scheme, but private traders were not restricted from operating in the market. The GPS 
system was strengthened by the Agricultural Products (Guaranteed Price and Paddy 
Milling) Act of 1961 with support from cooperative societies in the procurement and 
storage and processing of rice. Private traders simultaneously operated in the market with 
a higher share in areas where cooperatives had less activity. The Food Subsidy Scheme 
was also in operation, though subject to alterations at different times. Thus, the 
government played the role of a large-scale purchaser of paddy. Increasingly 
governments began to face severe foreign exchange problems and the need to purchase 
food from the domestic market became imperative. The demand for government 
procurement increased and this coincided with a time of high international food prices. In 
1971 the Paddy Marketing Board (PMB) was established with monopolistic rice trading 
powers within the country. 
The PMB was solely responsible for paddy procurement with cooperatives acting 
as its agents in buying paddy from farmers. The private sector was banned from 
procurement and marketing of paddy. The Food Commissioner’s Department continued 
to play its role as the import and distribution arm of the government. Although private 54 
businessmen were in theory only allowed to carry out milling, studies show that private 
trading was also operational during this period (Yoshimura et al., 1975).     
The universal consumer subsidy of rice was revised in 1970 to exclude income 
tax payers and in March 1978 the rice rationing system underwent a drastic and 
unprecedented change  (Gunawardena and Quilkey, 1987). This policy change was due to 
the advent of a new liberal economic policy adopted by the government that came into 
power in 1977.     
With the liberalization of the economy and the abolishing of the rice-rationing 
scheme, the need for the government to play a purchasing role began to diminish. The 
country had reached self-sufficiency in rice by this time. Large-scale rice imports were no 
longer necessary and the procurement and distribution of paddy was largely taken over 
by the private sector in the mid-eighties. The role of the PMB was reduced to price 
stabilizing during bad seasons. Although PMB purchases were about 5% countrywide in 
the 1980s, its contribution in the main rice producing districts was above 65% 
(Dharmaratne and Hathurusinghe, 1999).  The import of paddy earlier handled by the 
Food Commissioners Department was handed over in 1988 to three offshore companies 
functioning as bondsmen. Rice importing was brought under a licensing scheme and rice 
imports were subjected to tariff regulations after 1994. However, in times of crisis in the 
domestic rice production, the government has given duty waivers to importers and it is 
evident in many occasions that the ad-hoc waiver of duty lead to a glut of rice in the local 
market (Table 9).  
The PMB was shut down in 1996.  However this has not solved the crisis of low 
purchase prices during harvesting time having an adverse affect on poor farmers. It is 
evident that the government even during the period of the PMB had to intervene in 
purchasing paddy through the Cooperative Wholesale Establishment (CWE) or through 
Farmer Organizations during crisis times. Although the need for state involvement is not 
ruled out completely, through agreements with donor agencies such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, Sri Lanka has been continuing to open up its economy and increasingly 
committed to remove protection schemes for domestic producers.  Sri Lanka may have to 55 
continue this trend due to commitments originating from the Pakistan-Sri Lanka free 
trade agreement (FTA) to be negotiated in the near future. 
Table 9—Import Restrictions on Rice 
 











Jan1,1995-Feb7,1995  35 or Rs7/kg  0  55  0  Ex  4.5 
Feb8,1995-Apr14,1996  35 0 35  0 Ex  4.5 
Apr15,1996-Jan30,1997 35  35  0  0  Ex  4.5 
Jan31,1997-Nov20,1997  35 0 35  0 Ex  4.5 
Nov21,1997-Jan31,1998 35  35  0  0  Ex  4.5 
Feb01,1998-Nov05,1998  35 0 35  0 Ex  4.5 
Nov06,1998-Oct23,1999  35 0 35  0 Ex  5.5 
Oct24,1999-Dec31,1999  35 25 10  0 Ex  5.5 
Jan01,2000-May10,2000  35 0 35  0 Ex  5.5 
May11,2000-Jul  16,2000  35 0 35  0 Ex  6.5 
Jul17,2000*  35 0 35  0 Ex  6.5 
Jan2001*  35 0 35 14  Ex  6.5 
 
Source: Epaarachchi et al., 2002. 
 
 
5.3 CONCEPTUAL  MODEL 
In this study a conceptual model was developed to capture the changes in the 
policy framework discussed in the above section. A partial equilibrium model, treating 
Sri Lanka as a small net importer of rice, was developed.  It represents the consumer side 
by a demand system for cereals (rice, wheat and millet), the producer side by a paddy 
supply function, and marketing functions by an equation to link paddy prices and rice 
prices. Government procurement is considered as an exogenous variable affecting 
marketing functions. A tariff barrier and other border charges link retail price of rice with 
the world market price of rice. The demand system, paddy supply function and marketing 
function are considered stochastic and they were econometrically estimated.    
A few identities are used to close the model.  They are as follows.  A constant 
proportion technology between paddy and rice is considered.  Paddy demand is 
considered to be equal to supply as imports of paddy are prohibited. The level of rice 56 
imports was considered as the difference between domestic rice consumption and 
domestic rice production, adjusted for buffer stocks.  Calorie contents of rice, wheat and 
millet were used to obtain the total calorie intake.  As previously stated, the retail price of 
rice was linked to the world market price through a tariff barrier and other border 
charges.   
Trade policy was simulated by changing tariff levels and by eliminating other 
border charges that affect the retail price of rice.  Paddy procurement policy was 
simulated by changing the government involvement in procurement, which affects 
producer prices of paddy.  The algebraic structure of the model is given below. 
Demand Functions  
( ) M , P , P D D
w r r r =         ( 1 )  
( ) M , P , P , P D D
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Per capita demand for rice (D
r), wheat (D
w) and millet (D
m) are functions of the 
price of rice (P
r), price of wheat (P
w) and price of millet (P
m) and expenditure on rice, 
wheat and millet (M). 
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p p , , ,        ( 4 )  
Supply of paddy (S
p) is a function of lagged paddy price (P
p
t-1), price of seed 
paddy (P
s), price of fertilizer (P
f) and the time trend (T).   
Price Linkage Equation 
( ) G , P f P
r p =        ( 5 )  57 
Price of paddy is a function of price of rice and the ratio of paddy purchased by 
government agencies to total paddy output (G), which is a proxy for government 
intervention. 
Paddy/ Rice Conversion 
p r S cf S ⋅ =          ( 6 )  
 
Supply of rice (S
r) is a constant proportion (cf) of rice production.   
Rice Imports 
( ) STOCK S pop D IMP
R r − − ⋅ =       ( 7 )  
Imports of rice (IMP) is obtained by subtracting supply of rice and change in 
stocks (STOCK) from the total demand.  Total demand is obtained by multiplying the per 
capita demand for rice and population (pop). 
Tariff 
() Other tariff 1 P P
rw r + + =        ( 8 )  
Domestic price of rice is determined by the world market price of rice (P
rw), tariff 
rate (tariff) and other border charges (other).  
Calorie Intake 
m w r D ccm D ccw D ccr TOTCAL ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ =         (9)      
Total calorie intake (TOTCAL) is obtained using calorie contents of rice, wheat 
and millet (ccr, ccw and ccm respectively) and per capita demand for rice, wheat and 
millet.  
Endogenous Variables 
TOTCAL IMP S P S P D D D
r p p r m w r , , , , , , , ,   58 
Exogenous variables    
. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ccm and ccw ccr Other tariff P STOCK pop cf G T P P P P M
rw f s m w
 
Policy variables 
Other tariff G , , 
5.4 EMPIRICAL  MODEL 
Following Strotz (1957), it is considered that the consumer allocates expenditure 
among commodities in stages.  In the first stage, the consumer allocates expenditure to a 
broad groups of commodities such as food and non-food items.  In the second stage, the 
consumer is assumed to allocate expenditures within each of the broad groups to smaller 
subgroups (cereals, meat, vegetables, etc).  This process continues as you progress along 
the various stages.  This study considers the allocation of expenditure among cereals.  
The demand system includes three commodities, rice, wheat and millet to represent the 
three major cereals used in the Sri Lankan diet.  It is assumed that the utility of cereal 
consumption is weakly separable from the utility derived from other commodities.  
Accordingly, an almost ideal demand system (AIDS) was developed for rice, wheat and 
millet.  The algebraic form of AIDS is presented below, following Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980).  The AIDS in budget form is expressed as: 
t d P b P b P E c a w i i i i i i i ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = 2 2 1 1 ln ln ) / ( ln   (10) 
 
where: wi is the budget share of the i
th commodity, E is total consumption expenditure on 
rice, wheat and millet, Pi is the price of i
th commodity , and P  is the price index defined 
by  
j i ij j k i k k P P b P a a P ln ln 5 . 0 ln ln 0 ⋅ ⋅ ∑ ∑ + ⋅ ⋅ ∑ + = ,                        (11) 
and ao, ai ,ci,and  bij are parameters to be estimated. 
Deaton and Muellbaur (1980) suggest approximating the price index P  by the 
Stone geometric price index, as shown below.  
i i i P w P ln ln ⋅ ∑ =                         (12) 59 
The adding up restrictions for the demand system requires, 
Σi ai  =1,  Σi ci = 0,  Σj bij  = 0, and Σj di = 0.                 
The homogeneity restriction is  Σj bij  = 0,            
and the cross-equation symmetry restrictions can be imposed as 
bij = bji  for i ≠  j           
The demand model presented above is a non-linear system. This system has three 
equations to be estimated. However, due to theoretical restrictions it is sufficient to 
estimate only two equations and other parameters can be calculated using theoretical 
restrictions. The expenditure (eiy), own price (ηii), and cross price (eij) elasticity values are 
derived as follows (Sadoulet and Janvry, 1995): 
ηi=1+ci / wi ,; eii= -1- ci + bii / wi; eij = bii / wi – ci / wi  * wj 
The parameters were estimated using the two stage Least Square Estimation 
procedures in TSP version 4.2 (TSP International, 1997).  
5.5 DATA 
Data were obtained from government publications.  Per capita consumption of 
rice, wheat and millet were obtained from the Food Balance Sheets published by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).  Retail prices of rice 
and wheat and farm-gate prices of paddy were obtained from the Statistical Abstracts 
published by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.  The retail price of millet was obtained from 
HARTI.  Prices were deflated using Colombo Consumers Price Indices published by the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka.  Total paddy production, imports of rice, price of seed paddy, 
price of fertilizer, purchases of paddy under guaranteed price scheme and population 
were obtained from the Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. The price of 
fertilizer was obtained from A. Bours and Company (a major private sector supplier of 
fertilizer).   Descriptive statistics of the data used are presented in table 10. 60 
Table 10—Per capita Calorie Consumption in Different Sectors 
Variable Units  Mean  Standard  deviation 
Consumption of rice  Kg./head/year  95.6828  6.2319 
Consumption of wheat  Kg./head/year  43.9452  5.8325 
Consumption of millet  Kg./head/year  0.5190  0.2262 
Imports of rice  ‘000 Mt.  156.87  84.03 
Paddy production  ‘000 Mt.  2,122.13  505.10 
Retail price of rice  Rs./kg  13.54  7.01 
Retail price of wheat  Rs./kg  10.34  4.74 
Retail price of millet  Rs./kg  24.99  18.04 
Farm-gate price of paddy  Rs./kg  4.79  3.39 
Price of seed paddy  Rs./kg  139.48  108.90 
Price of fertilizer   Rs./kg.  4.948  4,788.61 
Colombo consumers price index  Index  801.65  356.49 
Purchases under GPS  ‘000 Mt.  225.20  221.90 
Population ‘000  15,863.80  2,098.07 
 
5.6 ECONOMETRIC  RESULTS 
5.6.1  The Demand System 
The parameter estimates of the AIDS demand system and the elasticity estimate 
of demand evaluated using 1990 values, which shows the middle of the sample, are 
presented in tables 11 and 12 respectively.   All the elasticity estimates of demand with 
respect to own prices have the expected negative sign and they are statistically significant 
at one percent level. 
5.6.2  Paddy Supply Function 
Paddy supply function was obtained through an econometric estimation using the 
following inverse equation. 
()( ) () ()()
() () 29 n 75 . 0 R
22 . 6 61 . 0 18 . 2 77 . 2 17 . 3
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(1) 
where:  61 
PDN is paddy production, FGP is farm gate price of paddy (lagged by one year), 
SP is the price of seed paddy, FP is price of fertilizer and t is the time trend.   The figures 
in parenthesis are t-statistics.   The equation was estimated for the 1971-1999 period. 
This form of the supply function implies that current production is determined by 
the product price that prevailed during the previous year. This relationship implies that 
current policy structure influences production in the next year. Elasticity estimates of 
paddy supply with respect to paddy price and input prices are also presented in table 12. 
The elasticity of supply with respect to own price has the expected positive sign and it is 
statistically significant. The supply elasticities with respect to input prices are negative 
and seed price elasticity is statistically significant. 
 
Table 11—Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors of the AIDS model     
                   (1979-2000) 
 
Dependent variable  Parameter  Estimate Standard  error  P-value 
Intercept 0.8269  0.6807  0.22 
Rice Price  0.0474  0.0267  0.07 
Wheat price  -0.0452  0.0265  0.08 
Rice share 
Expenditure -0.0216  0.1376  0.87 
Intercept 0.1307  0.6779  0.84 
Wheat price  0.0414  0.0264  0.11 
Wheat share 
Expenditure 0.0257  0.1370  0.85 
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Table 12—Elasticity Estimates: Demand, Supply and Price Linkage 
Type Variable  Elasticity  P-value 
Rice price  -0.9126  0.00 
Wheat price  -0.0543  0.44 
Millet price  -0.1279  0.08 
Rice demand 
Expenditure 0.9700 0.00 
Rice price  -0.2355  0.00 
Wheat price  -0.8728  0.00 
Millet price  -0.0145  0.01 
Wheat demand 
Expenditure 1.0949 0.03 
Rice price  0.1114  0.98 
Wheat price  0.8390  0.00 
Millet price  -1.2573  0.00 
Millet demand 
Expenditure 0.3068 0.82 
Paddy price  Rice price  1.004  0.00 
Paddy price  0.609  0.01 
Seed paddy price  -0.063  0.04 
Paddy supply 
Fertilizer price  -0.074  0.54 
 
5.6.3  Price Linkage Equation 
 
The price linkage equation is estimated by the following log-linear equation: 
() () ( )
() () 23 n 90 . 0 R
44 . 2 88 . 10 85 . 33
; Govt 004 . 0 RP 982 . 0 776 . 0 FGP
2 = =
⋅ + ⋅ + − =
 (2)′ 
Where FGP is a log of the farm-gate price of paddy, RP is a log of the retail price 
of rice and Govt is paddy purchased by government agencies as a percentage of the total 
output.  All the coefficients are statistically significant.  The equation was estimated for 
the 1978-2000 period. These results imply that the farm-gate price of paddy increases 
with an increase in rice price and that the price of paddy increases with an increase in the 
involvement of government agencies in purchasing paddy. The relationship contradicts 
the expectation that lack of government intervention (greater private buyer participation) 
improves the efficiency of the market due to competition among paddy buyers. High 
paddy prices due to government purchases suggest that in the absence of governmental 
intervention, private paddy buyers purchase paddy at lower prices, hinting a possible 
collusion among paddy buyers in the absence of government intervention.   63 
5.7 SIMULATION  RESULTS 
Econometrically estimated equations were combined with a few identities 
discussed in the conceptual model to develop a model to be used in simulation.  Data 
availability determined the period for simulation and it was 1979-1999.
4  The validity of 
the model was tested by comparing actual data with the predictions of the model for each 
endogenous variable.  Validation statistics are shown in table 13.  High correlation 
coefficients, low percentage root mean square errors and small bias are observed for all 
the variables except for imports that show a lower correlation coefficient and a higher 
percentage root mean square error.  The model was therefore used for simulation 
experiments.   
Table 13—Validation Statistics 
 





Calorie intake  50,422  0.98  317.67 
(0.628) 
0.0001 
Rice demand  95.68  0.88  2.79 
(2.915) 
0.0000 
Wheat demand   43.94  0.80  3.41 
(7.760) 
0.0000 
Rice imports  168,047  0.24  130,303 
(77.53) 
0.0002 
Rice supply  1,681,600  0.64  140,836 
(8.37) 
0.0002 
Paddy supply  2,402,285  0.64  164,882 
(6.86) 
0.0002 




Note: Figures in parenthesis are root mean square error as a percentage of the mean of the   
          variable. 
 
                                                 
4 Note that AIDS demand system was estimated for the 1979-2000 period and the paddy supply formula 
was estimated for the 1971-1999 period. These two equations restricted the period for the simulation 
experiments to be 1979-1999. 64 
Table 14—Impacts of Trade Liberalization on Prices, Calorie Intake, Demand, 
Production and Trade (evaluated at the mean of the sample) 
Policy Experiment  Variable Units  Baseline 



















































Note: Figures in parenthesis are percentage changes from the baseline value. 
 
Three simulations were done to assess the impacts of liberalization.  All border 
charges were removed in the first simulation. The second simulation was conducted by 
removing only import duties.  Paddy procurement policy was simulated next by allowing 
only private sector procurement. Results are shown in table 14.   
As expected, trade liberalization would have increased the demand for rice and 
calorie intake. It would also have decreased the price of paddy for the producer and 
therefore paddy and rice production levels should also have dropped.  As a result, there 
would have been a need to increase imports.  Removal of all border charges would have 
led to an increase of calorie intake by 33.15%.  If only import duties were removed, the 
respective increase in calorie increase would be 23.22%.   Figure 10 shows predicted and 
simulated values of calorie intake over the 1979-1999 period.  65 
Figure 10—Predicted and Simulated Levels of Calorie Intake 
 
 
TOTCALT:  Total calorie intake predicted by the model 
TOTCALK:  Total calorie intake simulated with removal of all border charges 
TOTCALL:  Total calorie intake simulated with removal of import tariffs  
TOTCALM:  Total calorie intake simulated with no government purchases 
 
If the government had no involvement in paddy purchases, the producer price of 
paddy would have declined by 2.15%, leading to a subsequent drop in production of 
paddy by 1.28%. It should be noted that in this simulation government purchases are set 
to be zero and the mean value of the government purchases during this period is rather 
small. As a result, the impacts are also small.  Such a policy would not influence the 
demand-side variables, as it was considered that Sri Lanka could import any amount of 
rice at world market prices, subject to trade restrictions.  Figure 11 and 12 show predicted 
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Figure 11—Prices of Paddy: Predicted and Simulated 
 
RFGPPT:  Real farm-gate price of paddy predicted by the model 
RFGPPK:  Real farm-gate price of paddy simulated with removal of all border charges 
RFGPPL:  Real farm-gate price of paddy simulated with removal of import tariffs 
RFGPPM:  Real farm-gate price of paddy simulated with no government purchases 
 
Figure 12—Production of Paddy: Predicted and Simulated 
TPPT:  Total paddy production predicted by the model 
TPPK:  Total paddy production simulated with removal of all border charges 
TPPL:  Total paddy production with removal of import tariffs 
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5.8 CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
This study clearly shows that if lower prices prevailed due to the absence of trade 
restrictions, calorie intake would have been higher. This suggests that trade liberalization 
can be used as a possible strategy to increase calorie intake.  Yet, producer prices, which 
determine the income of the paddy producers, would have been lower.  Such a reduction 
in incomes will lower the capacity of the farming community to purchase food, and it 
may offset some of the gains made by net consumers of food.  Furthermore, if a price 
drop occurs, inefficient high cost producers will have to leave the industry.  In Sri Lanka, 
paddy farmers with smallholdings are one of the poorest sections of the population, and 
therefore such an exit will have serious repercussions on poverty in the short term.  The 
central question here is whether gains to consumers exceed losses to producers?  
According to the underlying assumptions of the model used in this study, there is a net 
gain as gains can compensate the losses and trade liberalization can increase economic 
efficiency.  Using similar models, Rafeek and Samarathunga (2000) and Ekanayake 
(2003) show that rice-trade liberalization improves economic efficiency at national level.   
Furthermore, Weerahewa (2003b) shows that, gains to consumers exceed the losses to 
producers. This is due to the reduction in paddy and rice prices for households belonging 
to different income groups, sectors and provinces. This also indicates that there are 
efficiency gains from rice-trade liberalization at various other levels too.  Although these 
earlier studies mention poverty impacts, no attempt has been made to quantify the socio-
cultural and agronomic/environmental impacts of rice-trade liberalization.  Policymakers 
need to consider such non-economic impacts as well in deciding on a correct level and 
mix of trade policy interventions.    An important caveat to mention while interpreting the 
results of this study, however, is the fact that the model used is a static one and the 
dynamic effect of reduced income of paddy farmers, the resulting multiplier effects and 
impacts on the rural non-agricultural sector are not evident. 
The results of the study also show that by reforming the market so that the private 
sector is the sole purchaser of paddy, producer prices will be further depressed.  This 
could be due to the fact that lack of government interventions allows private paddy 
buyers to exercise oligopsony power on paddy sellers/producers who have a very low 68 
bargaining power.  The majority of paddy sellers in Sri Lanka are small-scale subsistence 
paddy farmers who do not have storage facilities and who need to sell the harvest 
immediately to repay loans obtained for cultivation and because of this their bargaining 
power is minimal.  According to Rupasena (2002), the major reason attributed to low 
farm prices is that buyers are not competing with each other in pricing and offering low 
prices.  Furthermore, the structure of the paddy market is such that the number of paddy 
millers is smaller than the number of paddy suppliers, allowing paddy millers to exert 
oligopsony power.
5  Further research is necessary to quantify the degree of market power, 
which is needed to identify the correct level of government intervention required.  
According to Dharmaratne and Hathurusinghe (1999), small paddy farmers are of the 
opinion that the government must purchase their total marketable surplus, and that the 
paddy-purchasing program of the government has been successful.   Batuwitage (1999) 
indicates that paddy purchasing by PMB should be continued in order to overcome some 
of the problems in marketing.  However, it should be noted that there was a policy failure 
to a certain extent even when PMB was in place.  Small farmers faced many problems 
when they tried to sell paddy to the PMB (Dharmaratne and Hathurusinghe, 1999).   
This study supports rice-trade liberalization because this strategy will decrease 
rice prices which is directly beneficial to consumers, as it increases calorie consumption. 
It is therefore argued that the government should minimize or eliminate import 
restrictions and encourage private sector importation of rice. However, at the same time, 
the government could monitor procurement of paddy from domestic producers, as past 
attempts at privatizing the domestic paddy-purchasing scheme have negatively affected 
both paddy prices and supply. This is mainly due to the inefficient nature of the domestic 
rice marketing structure (which is at the mercy of a few traders with monopolistic 
                                                 
5 Existing literature does not provide conclusive evidence regarding the structure of the paddy marketing 
industry in Sri Lanka.  Harrison (1995) stated that Sri Lanka had a competitive rice processing sector 
considering the number of rice millers in the industry.  It should be noted that the number of firms in an 
industry is a weak indicator of market power.  Strategic reactions among the firms determine the degree of 
market power.  An industry with a large number of firms may exercise monopoly and monopsony power if 
all the firms decide to collude.  In contrast, an industry with a small number of firms may act as a 
competitive industry if there is price competition among firms.  According to Rupasena (2002), 
competitiveness in farm markets in Sri Lanka has been curtailed due to the prevalence of only a few 
traders.   69 
powers). Therefore, it is also argued that the government should increase its presence in 
paddy procurement and thereby ensures that the interests of small-scale farmers 
(belonging to one of the lowest income groups in the country) are protected.  Striking a 
right balance between government-private involvements in paddy/rice marketing is 
therefore imperative.   
 
 
6.  RICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON 




The rice/paddy sector and poverty in Sri Lanka are closely associated. There are 
differences between the rich and the poor as far as the consumption pattern of rice is 
concerned.  Although rice is the major source of calories as well as a source of protein for 
both the rich and the poor, the calorie intake of the lowest and highest income deciles are 
1964 and 2097 kilo calories, respectively (Department of Census and Statistics, 2002).  
Furthermore, there are differences between the rich and the poor as far as income 
from paddy is concerned.  The incidence of poverty (head count ratio) at national level 
was reported at 25.17% in 1995/96 with a poverty line of Rs 791.61 per person per month 
(Gunawardena, 2000).  The rural sector, where paddy farming is mostly carried out, has 
continued to report figures above the national average in all three widely used poverty 
measures during three consecutive surveys conducted with five-year intervals: 1985/86, 
1990/91 and 1995/96. Table 15 presents the status of poverty in 1995/96 using different 
indicators. Also, according to the Department of Census and Statistics, high incidences of 
poverty are recorded in provinces with high rural populations such as Uva, Northwestern 
and Sabaragamuwa (Table 16). 70 
Table 15—Poverty by Sector, 1995/96 
Indicator* 
Incidence  Depth            Severity 
Sector 
Index Contribution  Index  Contribution Index Contribution 
Urban  14.67 8.11  2.95 7.64  0.91 7.31 
Rural  26.95 88.20  5.79 88.97  1.88 89.35 
Estate  24.92 3.69  4.88 3.39  1.55 3.33 
All  25.17 100.00  5.36 100.00  1.73 100.00 
 
Source: Gunawardena, 2000 
Note: * based on reference poverty line of Rs 791.67 per person per month.  
 
 
Table 16—Provincial Differences in Poverty in 1995/96 (Poverty Line Rs 791.67 Per 
Person Per Month) 
 
Indicator 
Incidence Depth Severity 
Province Agricultural 
households 
as a % 
rural 
households* 
Index Contribution Index Contribution Index Contribution 
Western 15.6  14  17  3  15  1  14 
Central 45.3  28  17  6  18  2  19 
Southern 42.4  26  16  6  16  2  16 
Northwestern 48.0 34  18  7  17  2  16 
Northcentral 82.6  31  8  6  7  2  7 
Uva 75.9  37  11  9  13  3  15 
Sabaragamuwa 51.1  32  14  7  14  2  14 
 
Source: Gunawardena, 2000 and SLIS, 1999-2000 
Note: * based on the reference poverty line of Rs 791.67 per person per month. 
 
According to Gunawardena (2000), the poor are more likely to be wage earners or 
receive income from agricultural income, less likely to receive income from non-farm 
self employment, less likely to receive pensions and foreign remittances, and are more 
likely to receive income from Janasaviya and Samurdhi
6 payments.  Table 17 shows 
poverty by type of income.  Also, it is stated that only 22% of the population own paddy 
land and that there appears to be an association between poverty and the size of paddy 
land holdings (Table 18)
7. 
                                                 
6 Poverty alleviation schemes launched by successive Sri Lankan governments. 
7 An exception is the higher poverty incidences reported for the >20 category, Gunawardena (2000) does 
not indicate why it was high. 71 
Table 17—Poverty by Source of Household Income 





Wage income only  23.86  0.334  1,436.77 
Agricultural self employment only  26.73  0.282  1,221.19 
Non-agricultural self employment income only  13.56  0.346  1,715.99 
Agricultural and non-agricultural self employment 
income only 
22.17 0.310  1,380.53 
Wage and self employment income  28.09  0.316  1,289.85 
No earned income  18.58 0.359  1,794.28 
 
Source: Gunawardena, 2000 
Note: * based on the reference poverty line of Rs 791.67 per person per month. 
**Gini coefficient is based on Lorenz curve and is commonly used measure of inequity. The value of Gini 
coefficient ranges between 0 and 1. A zero value shows a completely equal distribution (Lorenz curve 
is located on 45 degree line so that the area between 45 line and Lorenz curve is zero). The greater the 
value of Gini, the greater the degree of inequity in distribution.      
 
Table 18—Poverty in Sri Lanka by Size of Paddy Land Holding, 1995
8 
Landholding Size (Acres)  Incidence of Poverty*  Mean Consumption 
Landless 27.47  1,280.04 
0 – <1/8  24.86  1,125.23 
1/8 –< ¼  24.85  1,185.09 
¼ - <½  24.11  1,234.53 
½ - <1  28.66  1,269.58 
1 – <2  24.08  1,328.82 
2 – <3  24.72  1,311.11 
3 – <4  18.74  1,413.68 
4 – <5  10.86  1,940.08 
5 – <10  11.65  1,964.52 
10 – <20  15.62  1,934.07 
> 20  33.47  1,701.19 
 
Source: Gunawardena, 2000 
Note: * based on the reference poverty line of Rs 791.67 per person per month.  
 
 
The protection given by the interventions can be measured by the nominal rate of 
protection (NRP), the ratio of the domestic price over the border-equivalent price, and by 
the effective rate of protection (ERP), the ratio of value added under existing intervention 
over value added at the border price.  The NRP and ERP for rice were 25.1% and 25.8% 
for 2000. These numbers indicate that import restrictions were much more important than  
                                                 
8 In Sri Lanka paddy is cultivated mainly in low lands. Some areas are irrigated and others are rainfed. 72 
various supports on traded input in providing protection to the farmers (Epparachchi et 
al., 2002). However, we must also bear in mind that international prices in the year 2000 
were abnormally low, such that prices in many countries including India and Thailand 
were found to be 25% above the world price. 
NRP and ERP values greater than one imply that the Sri Lankan rice sector is not 
competitive.  Hence, with liberalization, imports would flow into the country, pulling 
down domestic prices to the world level—an advantage to consumers.  Paddy producers 
will loose.  While this type of policy increases the economic efficiency, impacts on 
poverty are less apparent as there are poor producers as well as poor consumers.  The 
purpose of this study is to assess the poverty impacts of rice-trade liberalization in Sri 
Lanka.   
Literature provides ample evidence regarding the impact of trade liberalization on 
poverty.  McCulloch et al., (2001) provide a framework to explain links between trade 
liberalization and poverty and show how countries and liberalizations are likely to vary 
from case to case.  According to ESCAP (1996) liberalization policies pursued by China, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam have made positive impacts on their 
economies.  Gulati and Narayanan (2002) indicate that rice trade liberalization has 
tremendous implications for poverty as 70% of the poor in Asia are engaged in paddy 
production.  They predict that there will be beneficial effects for poverty through 
producer price increases in exporting countries and through consumer price decreases in 
importing countries.  Deaton (1989) observed that an increase in rice prices in Thailand 
would benefit all rural households.  Minot and Goletti (2000) predicted that elimination 
of the rice export quota in Vietnam would raise prices and could be expected to reduce 
both the incidence and depth of poverty.  This study analyzes the impacts of liberalization 
of rice trade, on the status of poverty in Sri Lanka, which is a net rice importing country.  
It considers the importance of paddy and rice as a source of income and an expenditure 
item of the poor.  It shows the impacts of rice-trade liberalization on different groups of 
households at an average level. 73 
The chapter is organized as follows.  The next section provides a description of 
the trade policies implemented in the recent past.  The following section shows the status 
of income generation by paddy farming.  The methodology and data used in the analysis 
are presented next. Impacts of rice-trade liberalization at different levels are discussed 
next.  This is followed by the conclusions. 
6.2  RICE TRADE POLICY 
Until 1990, the Food Commissioner's Department (FCD) had the monopoly 
power in rice imports but later this was given to the Cooperative Wholesale 
Establishment (CWE). This government monopoly in importing rice continued until 
1993. In 1993, the private sector was allowed to import rice under licenses. In 1996, this 
licensing scheme was removed and anyone was allowed to import rice at anytime at a 
specified duty (Rupasena and Ravichandran, 2000). In 1997, the rice trade experienced a 
considerable degree of uncertainty and prices varied excessively during the year as trade 
policy relating to rice remained unpredictable (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1998). Even 
with a supply shortage in 1997, this unpredictable policy environment prevented private 
sector importers from importing rice. Only for the fourth quarter of 1997, a duty wavier 
was granted for a short period enabling more rice imports. However, due to this 
uncertainty bondsmen did not maintain any buffer stocks during 1997. 
Of the 168,000 metric tons (MT) imports of rice in 1998, 75% of the imports were 
during the month of January. This is mainly due to the duty wavier introduced to reduce 
the escalating price of rice in the domestic market. However, this duty wavier did not 
continue during the latter part of 1998, as the government's main aim was to protect 
farmers' interests by stabilizing paddy prices at a reasonable level. Rice imports during 
1999 amounted to 214,000 MT. Over two thirds of the imports were during the months of 
November and December. During this period, a partial reduction of duty on imports was 
granted with a view to stabilize domestic rice prices. The reduction of import duty on rice 
was 10-35% and was effective from 23 October 1999 to 31 December 1999.  74 
In July 2000, the licensing scheme was re-imposed on the import of rice and 
continued until 22 November 2001.  The government once again intervened in the market 
and allowed the private sector and the CWE to import 60,000 MT of rice on a duty-free 
basis. This decision was taken due to escalating rice prices in the market that were caused 
as a result of shortfalls in paddy production. Of the imports, CWE was allowed to import 
30,000 MT, while the balance was equally distributed among 15 private sector importers. 
However, only the private sector importers had imported the full quota of 30,000 MT of 
rice while the CWE had imported only a portion of the allocated quantity before 10 
December 2001. After the 10 December to 31 December 2001 period the duty rate 
applicable for importing rice has changed from duty free to 50% of the normal duty. 
The ad-voleram import duty was changed to a specific duty of Rs 7.00 per 
kilogram with effect from 21 January 2002.  However, CWE was allowed to import at a 
reduced duty of Rs 4.00 per kilogram.  The specific duty was reduced to Rs 5.00 per 
kilogram with effect from November 2002.   
This shows that rice-trade policy has not been very stable in Sri Lanka.  The main 
objective of the government has been to protect the paddy producer through trade policy, 
although at times tariff concessions were given to lower the rice price to relieve the 
pressure on consumers.   The next section shows that the rice-trade policy has only 
marginally helped in improving the income from paddy farming.  
6.3  INCOME FROM PADDY FARMING 
According to Ranaweera (1990), income from paddy farming has been declining 
over the years and paddy farmers do not receive a sufficient income to meet their basic 
needs. A more recent study by Weerahewa et al., (2003) also indicates the same. This 
section summarizes the findings of the latter study.   
An evaluation of income from paddy farming was done using maha (major 
cultivation season) data for 1980/81, 1990/91 and 2000/01 to assess the changes over the 
last two decades.  Income obtained from paddy farming per year was compared with the 
income of an average Sri Lankan family.  Table 19 shows the income from paddy 75 
farming and average per capita income in respective years in nominal and real terms.  
The analysis suggests that, the income of a paddy farmer with 1 acre is 20% of the 
average income of the country in 1980/81 and that it was 10% in 1990/91.  The value is 
only 5% in 2000/01 suggesting that the status of a small paddy farmer who possess only 4 
acres of lowland, has deteriorated significantly over the years.  
Table 19—Comparison of Income from Paddy Farming over the Years 
Year Units  1980/81  1990/91  2000/01 
Nominal income from irrigated paddy  Rs/ac/season  2,371.91 4,706.50  8,781.95
Colombo consumers price index  Index 318.20  1,008.60  2,539.80
Rs/ac/season  18,932.03 11,851.64  8,781.95 Real income from irrigated paddy  
Real income from irrigated paddy
1  Rs/ac/year  37,864.05 23,703.29  17,563.90
Gross domestic product in market prices  Rs million  66,527.00 321,784.00 1,255,535.00
Population  million            14.747           17.015  19.36
Per capita income in market prices  Rs  4,511.22 18,911.78  64,855.36
Real per capita income   Rs  36,007.55 47,622.59  64,855.36
Average income per household
2  Rs  180,037.76 238,112.97  324,276.82






0.21 0.10  0.05
 
Source:Weerahewa et al. (2003) 
* Obtained by dividing real income from paddy (assuming one acre is cultivated) by the avery income per 
household. 
 
Table 20 shows the profitability of irrigated paddy farming including and 
excluding family labor in different districts.  Irrigated paddy farming was taken here to 
represent the best-case scenario. On average, with profit excluding family labor, the 
income of a paddy farmer is Rs 8,781.95 per acre per season in 2000/ 01.  If the same 
income can be obtained by cultivating paddy in the same land in the following season, the 
income for a farmer who possess 1 acre, will be Rs 17,563.90 per year.  Even if the 
farmer possesses 4 acres, he could obtain an annual income of Rs 70,255.60 allowing him 
to be just above the poverty line
9.  This calculation considers that demand for family 
labor could be met by the family, even if 4 acres of paddy are cultivated.  It should be 
noted that the majority of paddy farmers in Sri Lanka have an extent of less than two 
acres, giving them an annual income less than Rs 35,127.80 from paddy alone.  These 
                                                 
9 Assuming a poverty line of 1000.00 Rs per month per person in 2000/01 poverty line for a household with 
5 members will be 1000.00*5*12= Rs 60,000.00 per household per year. 76 
numbers indicate that cultivating paddy alone does not allow a farm family to overcome 
poverty.  Thus, it is evident that the paddy sector is unable to generate reasonable family 
income with the current land holding size. 
Table 20—Profitability of Paddy Farming in Different Districts of Sri Lanka over 
the Years 
 
District 1980/81  1990/91  2000/01 
Profit (rupees per acre per 
season) 
Profit (rupees per acre per 
season) 




















Anuradhapura   1,496.94  2,042.26  4,709.00  2,522.00  2,570.16  7,767.11 
Polonnaruwa 1,304.84  2,113.81  2,167.00  635.00  5,275.29  10,005.65 
Kurunagala 1,908.71  2,533.55  7,779.00  5,257.00  3,815.80  9,507.26 
Hambanthota 2,483.47  2,798.01  4,171.00  2,427.00  2,786.11  7,847.77 
Average    1,798.49  2,371.91 2,710.25 4,706.50  3,611.84  8,781.94 
 
Source: Cost of Cultivation of Agricultural Crops: 1980/81, 1990/91 and 2000/2001 maha, Department of 
Agriculture. 
Note: *Imputed cost consists only of family labor. 
 
Table 21 shows income from paddy farming simulated under different incentive 
structures.  The second column shows the actual profit levels calculated using values 
reported in cost of cultivation reports for a 2 acre farm which cultivate both seasons. The 
third column shows the income of paddy farming with a 50% import tariff.   These 
income levels were obtained by increasing the base income levels by 15%, as the base 
tariff level was 35%.  Note that the tariff increase and resultant increase in consumer 
price of rice may not necessarily increase farmer income. For example, in early 2003, one 
kilogram of paddy was sold in the production areas for Rs 13.00 per kilogram.  Given a 
conversion ratio of 0.7, the rice price equivalent to paddy is Rs 18.57 per kilogram.   The 
retail price of rice in the market is between Rs 35.00-45.00 per kilogram implying that 
the marketing margin is unacceptably large.  Therefore, tariff increases may not be 
necessarily a good measure to augment farm income, given the marketing structure in the 
sector. These scenarios are taken to show that protectionism is not a good solution for 
augmenting paddy farm income even disregarding the impact on consumers. The fourth 77 
column of table 21 shows income from paddy farming if fertilizer is provided free of 
charge.  The fifth column shows income levels with free provision of fertilizer and under 
higher import tariffs.  The results show that under none of these incentive structures, 
paddy farming generates a sufficient income or provide a reasonable income for living.  
 
Table 21—Income from Paddy Farming Simulated under Different Incentive       
Structures (Rs/Year for a Two Acre Farm) 
 
District Actual  With  50%  Tariff With Free Fertilizer  With Free Fertilizer 
And High Tariff 
Anuradhapura 38,864.00  44,693.60  54,412.15 
Polonnaruwa 47,316.00  54,413.40  64,057.12 
Kurunagala 30,308.00  34,854.20  44,463.51 
Hambanthota 18,516.00  21,293.40  31,315.51 





42,227.92  48,562.11 
 
Source: Weerahewa et al (2003). 
 
Table 22 shows income from paddy farming with a deficiency payment scheme.  
Income from paddy farming was assessed under hypothetical paddy prices considering 
the cost of production as Rs 15,000.00 per acre and average yield as 2,000 kilograms per 
acre.  Government expenditure on the program was assessed too, considering paddy 
production in Sri Lanka is 2,860 million kilograms and market price of paddy as Rs 13.00 
per kilogram.  Table 22 shows that, a paddy farmer with 4 acres can earn an income 
comparable to the average income of a Sri Lankan, when paddy price is raised to Rs 30 
per kilogram.  This involves a huge subsidy of Rs 48,680.00 million. A deficiency 
payment system can maintain both consumer and producer welfare. However, given the 
current economic status of the country, it will add an unmanageable budget deficit and 
this solution is certainly not politically appealing. 
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13.00 11,000.00  22,000.00  44,000.00 88,000.00  0.00 
15.00 15,000.00  30,000.00  60,000.00  120,000.00  5,720.00 
20.00 25,000.00  50,000.00  100,000.00  200,000.00  20,020.00 
25.00 35,000.00  70,000.00  140,000.00  280,000.00  34,320.00 
30.00 45,000.00  90,000.00  180,000.00  360,000.00  48,680.00 
 
Source: Weerahewa et al. (2003). 
 
The above discussion shows that paddy farming when it is practiced as a mono 
crop cultivation on a small scale cannot provide a sufficient income for farmers.  Also, 
the study shows that it needs to be done on a large scale to reap the benefits of economies 
of scale.  Furthermore, it is clear that small farmers earn only modest returns from paddy 
cultivation. 
6.4 METHODOLOGY 
The method proposed by Nicita et al., (2002) to assess the poverty impacts of 
liberalization programs, and later used by McCulloch  (2002) to demonstrate the method 
and Weerahewa (2003) to assess the impacts of rice trade liberalization at provincial level 
is used for the analysis.  The detailed model is provided in the appendix.    
The model can be explained as follows.  The impacts of rice-trade liberalization, 
which lowers paddy and rice prices, are determined by the relative importance of 
rice/paddy in the expenditure and income of a household.  If a particular group depends 
more on paddy as an income source, there will be very high losses due to rice-trade 
liberalization.  Similarly, if a particular group spends a considerable share of expenditure 
on rice, there will be very high gains due to rice-trade liberalization.  Whether a particular 
group gains or losses due to rice trade liberalization is determined by the relative 
difference between income share and expenditure share of that group.  It is generally 
considered that poor people, especially in urban and estate areas, spend more on rice 
compared to other groups.  Also, agricultural households in rural areas depend very 79 
heavily on paddy as an income source relative to other groups.  Whether rice-trade 
liberalization helps the poor or not therefore is an empirical issue.  
6.5 DATA 
Following is a description of differences in income and expenditure shares among 
different groups in Sri Lanka. 
6.5.1  Expenditure and Income Shares by Income Group 
Following Gunawardena (2000), households were classified by the level of 
consumption expenditure.  Poor are defined as the households who live below the higher 
poverty line (Rs 950.00 per person per month). Very poor is defined as the households 
below the reference poverty line (Rs 791.67 per person per month).  Non-poor are the 
households who lie above the reference poverty line.  Food expenditure is a much large 
share of the household budget for the poor and very poor.  Rice comprises the largest 
share, and shows a decreasing share with increasing consumption expenditure 
(Gunawardena, 2000). Table 23 shows the expenditure shares. 
 
Table 23—Share of Different Items in Total Expenditure by Different Income 
Groups, 1995/96 
 
Group  Rice  Other Food  Non Food 
Poor (below the higher poverty line)  20.51  54.53  24.96 
Very poor (below the reference poverty line)  21.77  54.44  23.79 
Poor excluding very poor  18.90  54.64  26.46 
Non poor  10.11  46.95  42.94 
All 12.23  48.48  39.29 
 
Source: Calculated using the shares provided by Gunawardena (2000). 
 
Data on income from rice is not directly available and hence income from 
agriculture is presented below.  Agricultural income, which includes income from 
cultivation of paddy, tobacco, chilies, onions, vegetables and fruits, is important to the 
poor and very poor more than to the non poor (Table 24).  Also for the poor, the share of 80 
income from government transfer programs, Janasaviya and Samurdhi, exceed the 
earnings from agriculture.  
 
Table 24—Share of Different Items in Total Income by Different Income Groups, 
1995/96 
 




Poor (below the higher poverty line)  7.7  9.85  82.45 
Very poor (below the reference poverty line)  7.57  11.23  81.20 
Poor excluding very poor  7.9  7.64  84.46 
Non poor  4.97  3.27  91.76 
 
Source: Calculated using the shares provided by Gunawardena (2000). 
 
6.5.2  Expenditure and Income Shares by Sector 
Consumption patterns among sectors show that households in the estate sector 
have the biggest expenditure share on rice.  It is lowest in the urban sector (Table 25).  
Income patterns are such that rural households have the highest income share from 
agriculture among all sectors (Table 26).  Except in the case of the rural sector, share of 
income from government transfer programs is much higher than that from agriculture.  
As in the case of different income groups, because income from rice is not available, 
income from agriculture is given here.   
 
Table 25—Share of Different Items in Total Expenditure by Sector, 1995/96 
Sector  Rice  Other food  Non food 
Urban  5.18 32.33  62.50 
Rural  10.89 39.51 49.60 
Estate  14.87 52.13 33.00 
 
Source: Calculated using data from the Consumer Finances and Socio-Economic Survey 1996/97 of the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
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Table 26—Share of Different Items in Total Income by Sector, 1995/96 
Sector Agriculture  Samurdhi/  Janasaviya  Other  sources 
Urban  0.20 1.43  98.37 
Rural  6.97 6.31  86.72 
Estate  1.39 1.28  97.33 
All  5.90 5.51  88.59 
 
Source: Calculated using the shares provided by Gunawardena (2000). 
 
6.5.3  Expenditure and Income Shares by Provinces 
Expenditure shares and income shares at provincial level were obtained from the 
Consumer Finance and Socio-economic Survey of Central Bank and the Sri Lanka 
Integrated Survey (1999-2000) respectively.  As shown earlier, according to 
Gunawardena (2000) the highest incidence of poverty is observed in the Uva province 
(55%) and the lowest incidence of poverty is observed in the Western province (23%).  
These incidences are reflected in the pattern of income and expenditure.  Share of food 
expenditure and share of rice expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure are 56.2 
and 14.1% respectively in the Uva province and are the highest among all provinces.  
Contrary to this, these values are 41.8% and 6.5% in Western province and are the lowest 
among all provinces (Table 27).  Differences in poverty incidences are reflected in 
differences in income as well.  The percentage of farm income is highest in the Uva 
province (41.4%) and is lowest in the Western province (6.5%). Percentage of land under 
cultivation for rice was used to approximate the income from rice.  Though the area under 
rice is highest as a percentage of total area cultivated, income from rice is as low as 
2.66% in the Western province.  Income from rice is approximately 7% in Uva and 
Sabaragamuwa provinces (Table 28).   82 
Table 27—Consumer Expenditure Shares (1996/97) 
Province  Rice  Other food  Non food 
Western 6.50  35.30  58.20 
Central 10.90  39.60  49.50 
Southern 11.80  42.40  45.80 
Northwestern 13.20  42.60  44.20 
Northcentral 13.00 41.70  45.30 
Uva 14.10  42.10  43.80 
Sabaragamuwa 12.30  39.00  48.70 
All 9.90  38.50  51.60 
 
Source: Consumer Finances and Socio-economic Survey 1996/97 of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
 
 












Other Sources Except 
Rice and Samurdhi 
    Farm Rice    
Western  41.0  6.50 2.66  1.90  95.43 
Central  31.0  13.80 4.27  5.30  90.42 
Southern  33.5  20.80 6.96  3.70  89.33 
Northeastern  44.0  29.00 12.76  2.30  84.94 
Northwestern  22.4  10.50 2.35  4.70  92.94 
Northcentral  22.3  26.40 5.88  6.90  87.21 
Uva  18.6  41.40 7.70  6.80  85.49 
Sabaragamuwa  25.3  29.40 7.44  4.30  88.26 
All  28.3  17.80 5.11  3.60  91.29 
 
Source: SLIS 1999-2000. 
 
6.6  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The following section shows the efficiency gains of rice-trade liberalization to 
different groups of households.  In order to assess the impacts of rice-trade liberalization, 
prices of rice and paddy after trade liberalization need to be identified.  Current specific 
duty of Rs 5.00 per kilogram on rice is equivalent to a 25% tariff, as the cost insurance  
                                                 
10 Note that the percentage shares of different sources of income to total household income reported by 
SLIS (1999/2000) is very different from Central Bank (1996/1997) as the coverage of two surveys and the 
time periods are different. SLIS covers the entire island and the Central Bank does not include the North 
and the East 83 
freight (CIF) of rice is approximately Rs 18.00 per kilogram. Therefore, trade 
liberalization was modeled as a drop in prices of rice and paddy by 25% considering a 
perfect price transmission.  Also Epaarachchi et al., (2002), state a NRP of 25% for rice 
in year 2000.   
As stated earlier, due to differences in income shares and expenditure shares, 
different households experience different impacts on income and expenditure levels due 
to a change in price.  The following section shows the changes in income, changes in 
expenditure and changes in welfare in percentage terms resulting from a drop in price by 
25%.  Changes in income and changes in expenditure are always negative as a price drop 
is considered.  Change in welfare is obtained by subtracting “change in expenditure” 
from “change in income”.  If it is positive, it indicates that on average, loss in income can 
be compensated by the drop in expenditure, and hence there is a net gain due to rice-trade 
liberalization.  The higher the “change in welfare”, the higher the benefits of trade 
liberalization. 
6.6.1  Impacts by Income Group 
While all the income groups gain, the very poor people will obtain the highest 
welfare gain from trade liberalization and hence rice-trade liberalization can be called 
pro-poor. The lowest gain will be for the non-poor, as they spend only a small portion of 
their income on rice and they get a very small share of their income from agriculture
11 
(Table 29).  Results also show that the poor, excluding the very poor incur the highest 
losses. The highest reduction in expenditure is recorded for the very poor group. 
6.6.2  Impacts by Sector 
While all sectors gain from rice-trade liberalization, the estate sector gains the 
most (Table 30).  The estate sector records the second highest incidences of poverty in Sri 
Lanka—hence, trade liberalization can alleviate poverty to a certain degree.   Although 
                                                 
11 Note that the share of income from agriculture was used in the analysis due to non-availability of share of 
income from rice.  This must have over-estimated the losses and under-estimated the net gains from rice-
trade liberalization. 84 
paddy is one of the key income-generating activities, on average, a considerable portion 
of expenditure is incurred on rice in the rural sector.  As a result, even the rural sector has 
a net gain from rice-trade liberalization—though on average it incurs the highest income 
loss among the sectors (Table 30).  
 













Poor (below the higher poverty line)  -1.93 -5.13  3.20 
Very poor (below the reference poverty 
line)  -1.89 -5.44  3.55 
Poor excluding very poor  -1.98 -4.73  2.75 
Non poor  -1.24 -2.53  1.29 
 
 
Table 30—Impacts of Rice-Trade Liberalization by Sector (Percentage Changes) 
Income Group 
 








Urban  -0.05 -1.29  1.24 
Rural  -1.74 -2.72  0.98 
Estate  -0.35 -3.72  3.37 
 
6.6.3 Impacts  by  Province 
All the provinces too show a gain from rice-trade liberalization
12. The 
Northwestern province gains the most (Table 31).  As the Northwestern province is a 
province with high incidences of poverty, rice-trade liberalization can be called pro-poor.  
On average, a drop in price reduces the income of households by 1.28%.  Depending 
upon the share of income from rice, the reduction could be as high as 1.93% in Uva 
province and as low as 0.59% in the Northwestern province in which only a small 
                                                 
12 Due to unavailability of data the Northeastern province was not included in the analysis. 85 
proportion of land is under rice.  The producers in Uva and Sabaragamuwa incur the 
biggest losses.  The impacts of this price drop on expenditure also differ among 
provinces.  On average, it reduces expenditure by 2.48%.  The highest reduction is shown 
in the Uva province (3.53%) and lowest is in the Western province (1.63%).    
 









Change in Welfare 
 
Western -0.67  -1.63  0.96 
Central -1.07  -2.73  1.66 
Southern -1.74  -2.95  1.21 
Northwestern -0.59  -3.30  2.71 
Northcentral -1.47  -3.25  1.78 
Uva -1.93  -3.53  1.60 
Sabaragamuwa -1.86  -3.08  1.22 
All -1.28  -2.48  1.20 
 
6.6.4  Impacts by the Size of Paddy Holdings 
Data on income shares from paddy and expenditure shares on rice by farmers are 
needed to quantify the impacts of rice-trade liberalization by the size of paddy holding, 
using the above methodology.  Due to lack of data impacts by the size of holdings were 
inferred by considering the size of paddy holding required to meet the rice requirement of 
an average family. 
If an average family consists of 5 members and rice requirement per person per 
year is 96 kg (Food Balance Sheets, 2000), then family rice requirement is 475 kg/year.  
This is equivalent to 679 kg of paddy per year (assuming a conversion ratio of 0.7).  The 
average yield of paddy is approximately 3.856 metric ton/ha (1,560 kg/acre), and hence a 
0.217 acre plot is sufficient to meet the family needs if two seasons were cultivated with 
paddy.  Those who cultivate more than 0.217 acres are the net-sellers of paddy. 
The distribution of paddy land holdings indicates that approximately 7.5% of the 
paddy farmers possess holdings with less than 0.217 acres (Gunawardena, 2000).  This 86 
indicates that the rest of the farmers incur net losses due to rice-trade liberalization.  Of 
the paddy farmers, inefficient farmers may incur higher losses.  According to Weerahewa 
et al., (2003) farmers with an extent of less than 2 acres are inefficient.    Therefore, the 
biggest adverse impact of trade liberalization will be on the farmers with an extent of 
more than 0.217 acres and less than 2 acres.  
6.7  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The section on “income from paddy farming” illustrated that protectionist 
measures like higher tariffs, subsidies on inputs, etc. can marginally help in increasing the 
income from paddy farming, and hence their contribution to poverty alleviation among 
paddy farmers is marginal.  In contrast, the results of the present study reveal that the 
liberalization of the rice trade would not only improve economic efficiency, but would 
also help to alleviate poverty in certain categories.  On average, there will be gains from 
rice-trade liberalization for all the provinces, for all income groups and for all sectors.  
The highest gains will be for the estate sector among the sectors, for the very poor people 
among the income groups and for the Northwestern province among the provinces.  Even 
though the analysis was restricted to few categories mentioned above, based on the 
efficiency gains it could be concluded that rice-trade liberalization is a viable strategy. 
As in the case of many policies, there will be gainers and losers due to trade 
liberalization.  As Sri Lankan rice producers are relatively inefficient, consumers will 
gain, and producers will loose.  Consumers may not reap the gains from rice-trade 
liberalization if the market is imperfect.  Further research is necessary to assess the 
imperfections in the marketing system if any.  
Due to income loss for the present paddy farmers resulting from rice-trade 
liberalization, there will be serious repercussions on absolute poverty—at least in the 
short run.  The biggest loss will be incurred by farmers in the rural areas of Uva and 
Sabaragamuwa provinces who belong to the “poor excluding very poor” income group.  
Also such impacts will be more visible among small-scale farmers with an extent of little 
more than quarter acre of paddy. Further research is necessary to determine actual losses 87 
to these farmers.  However, the result of this study is indicative of such losses. Therefore 
it is recommended that along with reforms to liberalize rice trade, income transfers 
should be provided for such farmers to meet their basic needs.  Vocational training can 
also be provided to help them acquire new skills, which would allow a smooth transition 
of workers from paddy farming to other industries. 
6.8 APPENDIX 
 
A Methodology to Analyze the Impacts of Rice Trade Liberalization 
 
McCulloch (2002) who draws on the approach of Nicita et al., (2002) in their 
study of the impact of trade reform in Cambodia as the basic methodology proposes the 
following framework. When the income Y of a household be given by: 
 























j p is the price of output j; 
O
j q is the quantity of output j; 
I
k p  and 
I
k q are the 
corresponding input prices and quantities;  f w  is the wage rate for factor f;  f L is the net 
sale of factor f by the household; and  mn T  is the net transfer received by household 
member n from source m. 
Note that the first term in equation (1) is the value added of all production 
(whether from farming or non-farming enterprises). This includes both marketed 
production and own consumption. The second term is the value of net factor sales by the 
household—in the case of most poor households this simply means net labor sales (i.e., 
employment income minus payments for hired labor) since the only factor which most 
poor households can sell is their own labor. The final term represents the net transfers 
received by the household. 88 










i p is the buying price of good i and 
C
i q is the quantity consumed of good i. Note 
that 
C
i q  includes own consumption as well as goods purchased from the market. 
 
It is then possible to simulate the impact on household income of price changes 
induced by structural reforms. In the short run we can assume that all quantities remain 
fixed so that: 



















j T L w q p q p Y      (3) 
 






i q p C ∑∆ = ∆          (4)     
 
It is possible to show that a first order approximation of the change in money 
metric utility resulting from a change in the price of a commodity can be given by 
13     
 
C Y MMU ∆ − ∆ = ∆            (5) 
This makes intuitive sense: an increase (say) in the price of a good which is both 
produced and consumed will increase income and also increase the cost of achieving the 
original level of consumption. The difference between these is therefore an 
approximation to the welfare change. 



























































                                                 
13 See Chen and Ravallion (2002) for an exposition of the theory. 89 
where 
O
j BS  indicates the budget (or income) share of output revenue in total income,  
I
j BS  is the budget share of input costs, 
W
j BS  is the income share of net factor income 
from factor f, and 
C
j BS  is the budget share of good j in consumption. The first order 
percentage change in net income can approximate by the budget shares of income and 
expenditure on each item times the percentage changes in prices experienced.
14             
 
                                                 
14 See Minot and Goletti (2000) appendix 2 for a full derivation. 90 
7.  LIBERALIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND OLIGOPSONY: 




Importation of agricultural commodities in many countries is restricted through 
import tariffs and non-tariff barriers with a view of protecting primary producers.  This 
phenomenon has created inefficiencies in resource allocation in national economies by 
increasing prices of agricultural commodities.  Yet, countries continue to implement 
these policies assuming that markets are perfect and prices do transmit to primary 
producers.  However, markets for many primary products are imperfect as they are 
characterized by exploitative middlemen, who could depress the prices of primary 
products.  One such example is restriction of rice trade so as to protect paddy farmers in 
Sri Lanka. 
The rice sector in Sri Lanka has been protected by successive governments 
through import restrictions, provision of various input subsidies, and government 
involvement in importation, procurement and distribution. Recently, the policy 
framework started to shift towards more liberal policies by reducing some trade 
restrictions and allowing the private sector to participate in importation, procurement and 
distribution of rice.  Although liberalization of rice trade is encouraged by various donor 
agencies and trading agreements to acquire efficiency gains, it is opposed by various 
bodies highlighting its adverse impacts on paddy producers.  Therefore, the Sri Lankan 
government has been somewhat reluctant to fully liberalize rice trade, even though it has 
taken steps to liberalize the procurement scheme. 
Paddy production in Sri Lanka is mainly carried out by the small farmers.  About 
70% of the paddy  farmers  are  having  a land extent  less  than  one  hectare.   These  
farmers  relatively  have a smaller bargaining power when compare with the buyers of 
paddy (Shihar, 2004), allowing buyers to depress the price of the product.  The ability of 
buyers to depress price of the product subject to its supply curve, is known as oligopsony 
power. When there is an oligopsony power in the market, although it transmits price 91 
whenever there is a shock, producers do not get the “right price” as in the case of a 
competitive market.  It is always lower than the competitive price.  Hence, liberalization 
of rice trade, which would lead to a decrease in prices of paddy, can have significant 
adverse impacts on the income from paddy farming.    
The objective of this chapter is to assess the impact of rice trade liberalization on 
the paddy market in Sri Lanka, which is characterized by some degree of oligopsony 
power.  Using a static simulation model in a partial equilibrium setting, this chapter 
shows how trade liberalization affects paddy prices in the presence and absence of 
oligopsony power.  The chapter quantifies the adverse impacts of trade liberalization, that 
can be minimized if oligposony power can be eliminated. 
The chapter is organized as follows.  Next section shows some background 
information on the structure of paddy/rice market in Sri Lanka.  Following section 
provides the methodology; conceptual model, algebraic model and data.  Results are 
discussed next. Paper ends with conclusions and suggestions for further research.  
7.2  STRUCTURE OF THE PADDY/RICE MARKET IN SRI LANKA 
7.2.1  Government Involvement in Paddy Procurement 
Noting the concern over higher bargaining power of the paddy buyers, successive 
governments in Sri Lanka intervened in paddy marketing through paddy procurement 
schemes associated with a guaranteed price.  In 1971 the Paddy Marketing Board (PMB) 
was established with monopolistic rice trading powers within the country. The PMB was 
solely responsible for paddy procurement with cooperatives acting as its agents in buying 
paddy from farmers. The private sector was banned from procurement and marketing of 
paddy. The Food Commissioner’s Department played its role as the import and 
distribution arm of the government. Although private businessmen were only allowed to 
carry-out milling, studies show that private trading was also operational during this 
period (Yoshimura et al., 1975).  The role of the PMB was reduced to price stabilizing 
during bad seasons with the opening up of economy in 1977.  Although PMB purchases 
were about 5% countrywide in the 1980s, its contribution in the main rice producing 92 
districts was above 65% (Dharmaratne and Hathurusinghe, 1999).  PMB closed down its 
operations in 1996 and its functions at present are conducted by the Co-operative 
Wholesale Establishment (CWE) to a certain extent. Private sector mainly conducts 
paddy marketing operations. 
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka introduced a forward contract system in 1999 
based on the concept of contractual marketing system between the sellers and the buyers.  
An award of US$240,900 was received from the World Bank for the promotion of the 
concept in April 2002.  Only about 35,000 forward sales contracts have been signed 
between the parties during the first nine months (Central Bank, 2003) and majority of the 
farmers still sell their paddy in the open market.   
7.2.2  Trade policy on paddy/rice 
Up until 1988, rice was imported by the Food Department upon advise from the 
Ministry of Agriculture who decided the import requirement based on production 
forecasts of the year. The imported rice was distributed through multi purpose 
cooperative shops (MPCS), CWE and private wholesalers. The role played by the 
government through the Food Commissioner and the CWE as the sole importer of rice 
changed when the private sector companies were allowed to import rice since 1988.  The 
importation of rice was based on licensing and a strict quota system which was decided 
according to the deficit of the domestic demand after considering the domestic production 
and food security concerns of the country. Rice importation was initially offered to three 
off-shore companies (Rassas and Fitch, 1991).  These companies were allowed to import 
rice and store in the Food Department warehouses leased at commercial rates. Stocks 
were released to the market according to the requirement of the country and the duty was 
charged at the point of selling rice to the local market. Bondsmen were allowed to re-
export rice without paying duty.  There were 10 registered companies under the system 
by 1995 and only eight of these were active in the trade (Shilpi, 1995). According to the 
authors, bondsmen had little incentives to operate at the tariff and the conditions of 
operation in effect in 1995. By 1995, the government decided to liberalize rice imports. 
Licensing system was abolished and the tariff rate of 35% was in effect.  93 
After 1995, this rate of tariff remained unchanged in principle but waivers were 
granted at different rates in specified periods to curtail increasing prices in the domestic 
market due to production shortages in the market.  However, these duty waivers were not 
administered by the government vigilantly.  Therefore, sudden increases of imports 
during short duty waiver periods were well evident. One such incidence is the reduction 
of tariff during the 4
th quarter of 1999.  It is observed that two third of the total quantity 
of rice imported during the year was under the duty reduction facility.  The resultant 
decrease in prices of imported rice resulted in non-purchase of paddy by local millers 
causing difficulties to millers and paddy producers.  At present, there is a specific import 
duty of Rs. 7.00 per kg on rice imports. 
Paddy importation is banned in Sri Lanka.  At present, paddy is one of the items 
under import licenses.  Yet, both rice and paddy trade policy in Sri Lanka is well within 
the commitments of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as explained below. 
WTO stipulates conversion of non-tariff barriers (NTB) into tariff barriers and 
reduction in tariffs.  Sri Lanka has bound around 99% of the tariff lines of the agricultural 
products at 50% with the WTO.  However, at present, applied tariff rates of many items 
are as low as 25%, 10% and 2% except for a very few items. Specific duties have been 
introduced to some sensitive products including rice recently to protect domestic farmers.  
Sri Lanka identified about 75% to 50% of tariff lines which are covered under the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) of WTO, as ‘import-sensitive’ tariff lines and within 
that category some products, as ‘special products’ based on whether they affect food 
security, rural development and or livelihood security concerns.  Paddy and rice may be 
included here as rice is the staple food in Sri Lanka.  No tariff reduction commitments are 
applied for those products in their schedules of commitments. Rate of reduction (tariff 
cut) for import-sensitive items are lower than those for the balance items. 
At present, Sri Lanka does not have license control for agriculture items other 
than for plant quarantine purposes.  However, in some instances in the past, (July 2000) 
licensing was imposed temporarily to control falling domestic paddy prices due to the 94 
bumper paddy harvests. As stated earlier, later this licensing requirement was abolished 
and rice was subjected to a specific duty. Even though AoA requires all non-tariff 
barriers to be converted into tariff barriers and import licensing schemes could also be 
actionable policies, such market access provisions do not apply when the commodity in 
question is a traditional staple of a developing country.  As a result, in Sri Lanka, the 
import licensing scheme on rice can be exempted.   
In the world market, AoA was not expected to result in significant changes in 
world production of rice but the volume of trade was expected to rise by 5%, largely 
because of the market access commitments by Japan and the Republic of Korea (FAO, 
1999). Hence, the impact of AoA commitments on rice markets in Sri Lanka mainly 
depends on the commitments made by Sri Lanka.  As shown earlier, Sri Lanka has 
already eliminated the import-licensing scheme, and the only commitment will be to 
reduce tariff.  It is expected that rice will be included as a special product under the 
import-sensitive category, for which tariff reductions are not applicable or minimal. 
7.2.3  Imperfections in paddy/rice market 
Existing literature does not provide conclusive evidence regarding the 
imperfections in the paddy market in Sri Lanka.  According to Rupasena (2002), the 
major reason attributed to low farm prices is that buyers are not competing with each 
other in pricing and they are offering low prices and competitiveness has been curtailed 
due to the prevalence of only few traders.  Furthermore, there is evidence to say that free 
entry of paddy collectors from other areas to certain paddy producing areas is blocked by 
exploitative paddy collectors in the area, leading paddy producers with only few choices. 
Even though many argue that the interface between paddy producers and paddy 
collectors has not been competitive, some believe that Sri Lanka had a competitive rice 
processing sector (Harrison, 1995). This assessment was arrived by focusing on the 
number of rice millers in the industry, which was considerable during the period under 95 
consideration
15.  Wicramasinghe (1999) and Ubaldulah (1999) observe that the rice-
milling industry has experienced a decline in number of millers during 1997 as a result of 
rice-trade liberalization.  More than 100 mills stopped operations and about 20 large-
scale mills continued operations in Polonnaruwa area during this period showing the 
inability of small millers to survive (Wicramasinghe, 1999).   
According to Ellis et al. (1997), paddy market is efficient as evident by the paddy 
marketing margins, which are stable over the years, particularly when the PMB was at its 
minimal operation.  The authors hence recommended privatization of marketing activities 
so as to achieve efficiency gains.  However, one should note that the degree of market 
power is determined by the ability of one party to change the market price. A market 
could have stable margins over a length of time despite the presence of unequal 
bargaining power. 
7.2.4  Needed policy responses for the paddy/rice sector 
As described earlier, in order to correct the market failure due to oligopsony 
power of paddy buyers, government earlier introduced a price support cum a procurement 
scheme through PMB.  PMB was not successful due to inefficiency of government 
officials, bribery and corruption being the roots of inefficiency.  As a result, government 
procurement scheme was privatized.  While some are with the view that it is a right 
direction in policy and Sri Lanka should allow markets to determine prices as PMB was 
not successful, others with the view that government intervention in procurement is 
necessary as middlemen exploit the paddy producers.  Some others view that a 
government owned, privately managed institution is necessary to moderate paddy 
marketing.   
                                                 
15 It should be noted that the number of firms in an industry is a weak indicator of market power, and the 
strategic reactions among the firms determine the degree of market power.  An industry with a large 
number of firms may exercise monopoly and monopsony power if all the firms decide to collude.  In 
contrast, an industry with a small number of firms may act as a competitive industry, if there is price 
competition among firms. 96 
Paddy farmers are always of the opinion that the government must purchase their 
total marketable surplus, and even the PMB had some success though limited. Batuwitage 
(1999) indicates that paddy purchasing by PMB should be continued in order to 
overcome some of the problems in marketing.  However, Dharmaratne and 
Hathurusinghe (1999) indicate that small farmers faced many problems when they tried 
to sell paddy to the PMB and hence it is not a viable strategy.  Kodithuwakku (2003) 
suggests that the problems associated with the PMB were due to poor management and it 
does not indicate that government involvement is always unsuccessful.  Government 
should play an active role in paddy marketing together with private sector. 
 As stated earlier, rice trade was liberalized to a certain extent in the recent past to 
acquire efficiency gains from liberalization.  The studies evaluated the efficiency gains 
(Rafeek and Samarathunge, 2000 and Weerahewa, 2003) highlight the adverse impacts of 
rice trade liberalization on paddy producers which are quite significant when consider the 
presence of exploitative middlemen.  To author’s knowledge, no studies have been 
conducted so far to evaluate the impacts of rice trade liberalization incorporating the 
oligopsony power of middlemen in Sri Lanka.  The following section presents a market 
model under oligopsony which could quantify the gains with the elimination of market 
power if at all it is possible, and capture the impacts of liberalization of rice trade. 
7.3 METHODOLOGY 
7.3.1 Conceptual  Model 
A partial equilibrium model under imperfect competition considering perfect 
competition and monopsony as special cases was developed for the paddy market (Figure 
13).  In this model, the demand function is a derived demand function of paddy buyers 
(D).  The supply function is the farm-gate supply of paddy by the primary producers (S).  
The market clears when paddy demand is equal to paddy supply as paddy imports are 
banned.  When the market is perfectly competitive, equilibrium price is determined when 
the demand curve intersects with the supply curve (A).  When the market is a monopsony, 
equilibrium quantity is determined when the demand curve intersects with the marginal 97 
expenditure (ME) curve and equilibrium price is determined when the equilibrium 
quantity intersects with the supply curve (E). 
Figure 13 shows the equilibrium of the paddy market before and after trade 
liberalization under perfect competition and monopsony.  Equilibrium quantity and price 
in the perfectly competitive market are given by X
A and W
A respectively and equilibrium 
quantity and price in the monopsony market are given by X
E and W
E respectively before 
trade liberalization.  As trade liberalization leads to a drop in rice price, demand for 
paddy shifts to the left as an effect of trade liberalization.  Equilibrium quantity and price 
in the perfectly competitive market are given by X
B and W
B respectively and equilibrium 
quantity and price in the monopsony market are given by X
F and W
F respectively after 
trade liberalization.  As shown in figure 13, the direction of the impacts of trade 
liberalization on paddy prices and quantities, which are negative, does not depend on the 
structure of the market, i.e., whether it is perfectly competitive or monopsony.   
The present situation of the Sri Lankan paddy market is close to a situation 
depicted by the equilibrium E.  The rice market is protected by a tariff barrier and 
monopsony power exits and hence, equilibrium quantity and price in the market are given 
by X
E and W
E respectively.  If trade is liberalized together with a reform to eliminate 
market power, the market will move to the equilibrium B.  The equilibrium quantity and 
price in the market will be given by X
B and W
B respectively, indicating an increase in 
price and quantity due to the policy reform.  Hence, it is clear that depending upon the 
slope and position of demand and supply curves and the size of trade liberalization shock, 
it is possible to have positive impacts due to trade liberalization if it is coupled with 
market reforms to eliminate monopsony power.   
As stated earlier, figure 13 only shows two extreme cases as the structure of the 
market, i.e., perfect competition and monopsony.  In reality, the equilibrium of the 
market can lie at any point between the perfect competition and monopsony, i.e., 
oligopsony.  This can be captured by including conjectural variation elasticity in the 
derived demand function, as described in the following section.  98 
Figure 13—Equilibrium in the Paddy Market before and after Tariff Liberalization 































7.3.2 Algebraic  Model 
Suppose that paddy processors (collectors/millers) are competitive in the output 
market and they possess oligopsony power in the input market
16.  Oligopsony power in 
the input market can be captured by the conjectural variation approach, which considers 
the strategic interactions among the firms.  Conjectural variation approach to measure 
market power considers that firms simultaneously and independently choose input levels 
                                                 
16 Output market is treated to be competitive as it is open to world market subject to an import tariff.  Note 
that when the output market is competitive, middlemen cannot exert oligopoly power over the final 
consumers even though they can exert oligopsony power over the primary producers. 
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given their beliefs about their rival’s reactions to their choice.  Following Azzam and 
Pagoulatos (1990), model given below was developed to capture the oligopsony power.  
Suppose that the objective of the j
th paddy processor is to maximize profit  J π : 
j j j x W q P Max ⋅ − ⋅ = π                                                               (1) 
Subject to, 
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() Zs , X W W =              ( 4 )  
Where P is price of rice,  j q is quantity of rice produced by the j
th firm, W is price 
of paddy,  j x  is quantity of paddy demanded by the j
th firm,  X is the industry supply of 
paddy and Zs is exogenous factors affecting paddy supply.  Equation (2) presents the 
production function of the j
th firm, equation (3) presents the industry demand for paddy 
considering that there are n number of firms in the industry, and equation (4) shows the 
industry supply of paddy.  The first order conditions of the above problem is, 


























     ( 5 )  



















= ⋅        ( 6 )  
 
Equation (6) can be simplified to write, 
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= θ  is the conjectural variation elasticity and it shows the ability of the j
th 
firm to influence the total quantity demanded by the industry.  ε is the supply elasticity of 100 






 by definition. When  1 = θ , market is monopsony and for all the other values, 
0<θ<1 it shows an oligopsony. The market power of the processor is given by the 
Learner Index θ/ ε.  The higher the θ and the lower the ε are, the higher the market power 
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j MP , marginal product of paddy, is a function of xj for a well behaved production 
function. Hence demand for xj can be written as, 
() zd , Wd , P x x j j =          ( 9 )  
Where zd is a vector of other factors affecting demand. Assuming aggregation conditions 
hold, demand for X by the industry is given by, 








equilibrium in the input market is given by the equations (4), (8), and 
(10). The exogenous policy variable in the system are P, Zd and Zs, and endogenous 
variables are Wd, X and W. 
7.4 DATA 
The above model was calibrated for the paddy market in Sri Lanka using the 
quantities and prices in 2001.  Quantity of paddy supplied and demanded was considered 
as 2,700,000 Mt and prices of paddy and rice were considered as 12.00 Rs/kg and 32.50 
Rs/kg respectively (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2001).   A range of elasticity values for 
supply and demand was used; i.e. |0.5|, |1.0|, and |1.5| were chosen to show inelastic, 
unitary elastic and elastic supply and demand functions respectively.  Similarly, a range 
of conjectural variation elasticity values was used in the sensitivity analysis; i.e. 0.0, 0.5 
and 1.0 were chosen to show perfect competition, ologopsony and monopsony 
respectively. Value of the endogenous variable, Wd, was generated under different 
scenarios using above data.   101 
7.5 SIMULATION  RESULTS 
Three policy experiments were conducted: trade liberalization, elimination of 
market power and trade liberalization along with elimination of market power.  Trade 
liberalization was modeled by reducing the retail price of rice by 30%.  Elimination of 
market power was modeled by setting conjectural variation elasticity to zero.  Impacts 
were assessed under different assumptions regarding the elasticity values of demand and 
supply. 
As expected, results show that rice trade liberalization has negative impacts on 
paddy production and paddy prices.  Regardless of the degree of oligopsony power and 
price elasticities, a drop in price of rice by 30% decreases paddy price from 12.00 to 
10.20, which a drop by 15%.  Depending upon the elasticity values considered, paddy 
production could drop by 7.5 to 15%. 
Table 32—Impacts of Trade Liberalization on the Paddy Market  
No Market Power  Trade Liberalization 
and No Market Power 
Elasticity Market 
Structure 
Price Quantity Price Quantity 
                                       Baseline values  12.00  2700.00  12.00  2700.00 
Oligopsony 13.71  3278.57 11.66  2504.28 
 (14.28)  (21.42)  (-2.86)  (-4.29) 
Monopsony 15.00  3712.50 12.75  2953.12 
Elastic 
| 1.5 | 
 (25.00)  (37.50)  (6.25)  (9.38) 
Oligopsony 14.40  3240.00 12.24  2754.00 
 (20.00)  (20.00)  (2.00)  (2.00) 
Monopsony 16.00  3600.00  13.6  3060.00 
Unitary elastic 
| 1.0 | 
 (33.00)  (33.00)  (13.00)  (13.00) 
Oligopsony 16.00  3150.00 13.60  2880.00 
 (33.33)  (16.67)  (13.33)  (6.67) 
Monopsony 18.00  3375.00 15.30  3071.25 
Inelastic 
| 0.5 | 
 (50.00)  (25.00)  (27.5)  (13.75) 
 
Numbers in parenthesis are percentage change from the baseline equilibrium. 
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Also results show that elimination of market power has positive impacts on prices 
and quantities under all scenarios.  When the supply is inelastic, degree of oligopsony 
power is high, so that impacts due to elimination of oligopsony power too is high.  Table 
32 shows the impacts under various scenarios. If the demand and supply functions are 
elastic and conjectural variation elasticity is 0.5 (oligopsony), elimination of oligopsony 
power could increase paddy price from Rs.12.00 to Rs. 13.71 which is an increase by 
14.28%. If they are inelastic and conjectural elasticity is 1.0 (monopsony), the impact on 
price could be as high as 50%.      
Simultaneous liberalization of trade and elimination of market power have 
uncertain impacts on paddy production and prices.  The sign of the impacts depend on the 
elasticities of supply and demand and the structure of the market.  If the degree of market 
power is relatively small, i.e., when conjectural variation is 0.5 (oligopsony), trade 
liberalization has negative impacts on production and prices, despite elimination of 
oligopsony power.  When the conjectural variation elasticity is close to 1.0 (close to 
monopsony), there is a certain positive impact of trade liberalization on production and 
price if oligopsony power can be eliminated.  Furthermore, the sign of the impact also 
depend on the elasticities of supply and demand.  If the supply elasticity value is 
inelastic, liberalization of trade along with reforms to eliminate market power leads to 
higher gains, as the baseline equilibrium is characterized by high oligopsony power.  
Many authors have found that supply elasticity with respect to own price is inelastic for 
paddy in Sri Lanka (Niranjan et al., 2000 and Weerahewa, 2003), and hence latter 
scenario represents the reality to a larger degree. 
7.6  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Liberalization of agricultural trade in many countries may continue to acquire 
efficiency gains as suggested by various trade agreements and donor agencies.  Policy 
makers are concerned about the adverse impact of agricultural trade liberalization on 
primary producers as they are already exploited by the middlemen.  This study analyzes 
the impacts of rice trade liberalization on paddy market in Sri Lanka which is 103 
characterized by some degree of oligopsony power. Results of the analysis show that 
losses to the paddy producers due to trade liberalization can be considerably minimized if 
oligoposony power can be eliminated simultaneously.  Further research is necessary to 
reveal the degree of oligopsony power, which would be required to assess the size of 
losses due to oligopsony power.   
The study recommends rice trade liberalization to acquire efficiency gains 
together with market reforms to eliminate market power exercised by middlemen.  One of 
such market reforms is government procurement with a price support scheme to maintain 
competitive paddy prices.  If such a reform is chosen, levels of price support should be 
adjusted to reflect the changes in the market due to policy regime (trade liberalization) or 
natural factors (bumper harvest) in order to minimize efficiency losses arisen due to price 
support scheme. For example, if trade is liberalized, support price should also be reduced.  
Otherwise it will have adverse impacts on the milling sector.  If there is a bumper crop, 
lowering of support price will be necessary, which may lead to lowering of rice prices as 
well.  Reforms to increase the bargaining power of paddy producers should also be 
seriously considered to correct market failure due to exploitative middlemen.  They may 
include provision of credit and storage facilities to farmers and strengthening of farmer 
organizations. 
 104 
8.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
The impacts of trade liberalization and market reforms are case specific.  Some 
countries have achieved food security through trade liberalization and reforming markets 
through deregulation, while others have not.  The rice sector in Sri Lanka has been 
protected by successive governments through the provision of various input subsidies, 
government involvement in importation, procurement and distribution, and import 
restrictions. Recently, the policy framework started to shift towards more liberal policies, 
by allowing the private sector to participate in importation, procurement and distribution 
of rice.  However, rice trade has been restricted as policy markers view that trade 
liberalization may have adverse impacts on poverty. 
Given this background, the overall objective of this study is to assess the impacts 
of different types of policies on the status of food security with special emphasis on 
paddy/rice sector in Sri Lanka.  The specific objectives are: 
(a) To describe the present status of paddy production, procurement and distribution 
system in Sri Lanka, paying special attention to the involvement of government 
agencies and private sector. 
(b) To document the evolution of domestic and trade policies affecting the above 
system showing the extent of liberalization over time. 
(c) To examine Sri Lanka’s position on the Agreement on Agriculture in the WTO 
and its likely impact on paddy/rice sector. 
(d) To investigate the impact of rice trade liberalization and privatization of paddy 
procurement system on prices, supply of paddy, demand for rice, imports of rice 
and calorie intake at the national level. 105 
(e) To investigate the impact of rice trade liberalization at the household level, and 
for various groups in the population, with a view to understand the implications 
for poverty. 
(f)  To investigate the likely impacts of elimination of oligopsony power of the paddy 
collectors on the well being of paddy farmers. 
The analysis of the marketing channels for paddy/rice indicates that they are 
mainly performed by the private sector.  State involvement in procurement, storage and 
distribution has been minimal.  Import restrictions on rice have been very ad-hoc, 
imposing restrictions during glut seasons and relaxing them during rice shortage periods. 
The analysis of the commitments with WTO shows that Sri Lanka did not have to 
liberalize the rice market due to WTO commitments as negotiated at the Uruguay Round.  
Trade restrictions and domestic support provisions at present are well within WTO rules.  
The attempts made so far to liberalize the rice market are unilateral, in order to obtain 
efficiency gains. 
The impacts of rice trade liberalization and privatization of government 
procurement program were simulated using an econometrically estimated partial 
equilibrium model.  Results reveal that with the drop in retail prices due to trade 
liberalization, calorie intake will be increased and hence trade liberalization can be used 
as a possible strategy to increase food security.  Yet, it depresses producer prices, which 
would reduce the income of the paddy producers.  Such a reduction in incomes will lower 
the capacity of the farming community to purchase food, and it may offset some of the 
gains of the net consumers of food.  Furthermore, due to a drop in prices, inefficient high 
cost producers will leave the industry.  In Sri Lanka, paddy farmers with smallholdings 
are the inefficient farmers.  Therefore such an exit may have serious repercussions on 
poverty.  Also, the results show that by reforming the market so as to allow only the 
private sector to purchase paddy, producer price will be further depressed.  Such a policy 
can clearly reduce the status of food security of the farming community.   106 
At present, legal framework in the country does not allow conversion of paddy 
lands into non-paddy lands.  Furthermore, when paddy lands are converted into other 
land uses water-logging conditions can be arisen in the wet zone areas.  As a result, lands 
that are released from paddy cultivation may not be demanded by the other sectors.  
Therefore, there will be adverse impacts of rice trade liberalization on paddy landowners 
also.  The model treats wage rate as exogenous, as the wage rate is considered to be 
determined by the supply and demand conditions in the non-farm sector.  If the wage rate 
adjusts to the changes in the rice market, then there will be adverse impacts of rice trade 
liberalization on the labor force as well.   
Since the above mentioned results indicate adverse impacts farming community, 
which considers to be poor, poverty impacts of trade liberalization were examined for 
different groups of people in the country.  Results suggest that there is a net gain to all the 
income groups, provinces and sectors due to trade liberalization.  The biggest gainers are 
the very poor (defined here as those who earn an income Rs. 791.67 per person per 
month), the North-western province and the estate sector, where the poverty incidences 
are found to be the highest.  Paddy farmers with relatively bigger holdings (defined here 
as greater than 0.217 acres and less than 2 acres) are found to be negatively affected.  It 
appears from the results that rice trade liberalization is a pro-poor policy.  However, the 
losses to the net producers of paddy were not fully incorporated in the analysis due to 
unavailability of data.  Also, the analysis assumed that quantities do not adjust due to 
price changes and results only show the impacts in the short run.  Further analysis is 
necessary to reveal medium- and long-term impacts. 
Next, elimination of oligopsony power of middlemen was assessed as one of the 
strategies to mitigate the adverse impacts of rice trade liberalization on the farming 
community.  The impacts of rice trade liberalization along with elimination of 
oligoposony power were simulated under a partial equilibrium setting.  Results reveal 
that losses to the paddy producers due to trade liberalization can be minimized if 
oligoposony power can be eliminated simultaneously.  Further research is necessary to 107 
reveal the degree of oligopsony power, which would be required to assess the size of 
losses due to oligopsony power. 
In general, while the study supports rice trade liberalization to acquire efficiency 
gains, it is recommended that it to be implemented together with market reforms to 
eliminate market power exercised by middlemen and/or with mechanisms to increase the 
bargaining power of the farmers.  Market reforms to eliminate oligopsony power could be 
conducted by increasing government procurements and having price support schemes to 
maintain competitive paddy prices. It should however be noted that the Doha negotiations 
are mainly focused on the behind-the-border reforms, and price support programs may 
not be allowed.  Commitments with Doha should be carefully examined and negotiated in 
order to develop policies to improve the rice sector in Sri Lanka.  Liberalization of land 
market, provision of credit and storage facilities, strengthening of farmer organizations 
are some of the strategies to improve the bargaining power of the farmers. 
Future research in this area needs to focus on the following areas: (i) assessing the 
ways and means of strengthening the small farmers from the exploitative traders, (ii) 
evaluating “land consolidation” as a measure of increasing bargaining power of the small 
farmers, (iii) assessing the role of farmer organizations, and (iv) evaluating contract 
farming as a viable strategy. 108 
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